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Tinker Meets the Cyberbully: A Federal 
Circuit Conflict Round-Up and 
Proposed New Standard for Off-
Campus Speech 
Benjamin A. Holden* 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
the seminal school speech case interpreting the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
long before mobile devices and social media upended accepted 
norms governing how students behave at school. The new reality 
has brought with it new line-drawing challenges for public schools 
faced with the warring requirements of school discipline on the 
one hand, and the First Amendment on the other. The threshold 
unanswered question this Article presents is whether Tinker should 
give jurisdiction to public schools over student speech which 
originates off campus. But the more difficult task is this: Assuming 
Tinker does apply to off-campus speech, what legal test ought to 
govern, in light of the patchwork of inconsistent rules the federal 
courts employ. Building toward a novel theory to answer this 
question, this Article first summarizes the precedents delineating 
speech rights of students at public schools; then outlines the 
federal circuit conflict arising out of the off-campus student speech 
cases in the absence of Supreme Court guidance; and finally, 
proposes a new rule for when and how Tinker should be extended 
to off-campus speech, including cyberbullying. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court since October 2011 has at least four 
times denied certiorari in cases implicating the question: Can 
public primary and secondary schools1 exert disciplinary authority 
                                                                                                             
1 This Article does not address the applicability of the student speech/First 
Amendment Supreme Court cases discussed below to college students, a question the 
Supreme Court expressly left unanswered in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 
484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (“We need not now decide whether the same degree of 
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the 
college and university level.”). Therefore, the student speech precedents this Article 
discusses are presumed applicable only to primary and secondary schools. Note, 
however, that great conflict exists among the federal circuit courts, as well as among state 
courts, on whether Hazelwood is applicable in a college setting. See Keefe v. Adams, 840 
F.3d 523, 531 (8th Cir. 2016) (denying First Amendment protection to a nursing student, 
and upholding administrators’ decision to require that students comply with professional 
fitness standards on or off campus); O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 932–33 (9th Cir. 
2016) (finding a colorable First Amendment claim brought by a university student-
plaintiff, while expressly noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished Hazelwood in Oyama v. University of Hawaii, 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 
2015), and has declined to extend the pedagogical concerns analysis to university 
setting); Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856, 862, 868–74 (involving hybrid student-employee, 
wherein the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit focused on the Hazelwood 
“imprimatur” of the school factor, discussed below, to find the student seeking 
professional certification failed to qualify for First Amendment protection where 
student’s stated views rendered him unfit to receive such certification on professional 
grounds); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Nothing in Hazelwood 
suggests a stop-go distinction between student speech at the high school and university 
levels, and we decline to create one.”); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875–76 
(11th Cir. 2011) (applying Hazelwood in a university setting); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 
356 F.3d 1277, 1285, 1289–93 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a student’s First Amendment 
claim based on compelled use of expletives in acting class and holding that such speech 
“constitutes ‘school-sponsored speech’ and is thus governed by Hazelwood”); Student 
Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood . . . is not 
applicable to college newspapers.”); see also Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 
1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the First Amendment claims of a public college student 
who was also an employee of that college and noting: “The fact that the state could have 
attempted to assert its authority over Watts as a student, subject to the Tinker restrictions, 
does not prevent [the state] from asserting authority over him as an employee . . . .”); 
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 943, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that a graduate student who 
included foul, offensive language aimed at faculty in his thesis paper was not protected 
by the First Amendment); Yeasin v. Univ. of Kan., 360 P.3d 423, 424 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2015) (ruling that the University of Kansas had no authority to expel a student who made 
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consistent with the First Amendment over student cyberspeech2 
that: (1) originated off-campus, (2) made its way onto campus, and 
(3) at the time it was communicated, raised a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of material school disruption or interference with 
the learning of other students?3 This Article suggests an answer to 
                                                                                                             
threatening remarks on Twitter); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 
2012) (ruling that a mortuary science student who posted offensive material on Facebook 
was protected by the First Amendment, because considering Facebook posts to be of 
legitimate pedagogical concern would give Universities “wide-ranging authority to 
constrain offensive or controversial Internet activity”). But see Frank D. LoMonte, “The 
Key Word Is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 305, 341 (2013); Marcus Hauer, Note, The Constitutionality of Public 
University Bans of Student-Athlete Speech Through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV. 413, 
423 (2012) (“[O]n a sliding scale, the speech restrictions allowed by universities fall 
somewhere between the stricter restrictions allowed by high schools and the significantly 
lighter restrictions allowed on the community at large.”). 
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). Cyberspeech for purposes of this Article is 
speech emailed, texted, posted, tweeted, or otherwise communicated to a social media 
website such as Facebook, to a hosted or unhosted “chat room,” to the comment section 
of a news or information website, or directly to third parties via computer, cellular phone, 
iPad, game console, or other electronic communication device. This Article has 
constructed a composite definition of cyberspeech based on the many varying definitions 
and related cyberbullying concepts reviewed. The definition adopted here relies, in part, 
upon CORINNE DAVID-FERDON & MARCI FELDMAN HERTZ, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND YOUTH VIOLENCE: A CDC ISSUE BRIEF FOR 
RESEARCHERS 3 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/electronic_
aggression_researcher_brief-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGX6-UMLM] (employing the term 
“electronic aggression” rather than cyberbullying or cyberspeech); see also For Teens & 
Tweens: Cyberbullying, MONT. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://dojmt.gov/safeinyourspace/for-
teens-tweens-cyberbullying/ [https://perma.cc/A8ZE-J3XV] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
3 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 
(2016) (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 7299351, at *i; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kowalski 
v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 565 U.S. 1173 (2012) (No. 11-461), 2011 WL 4874091, at *i; 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Snyder, 565 U.S. 1156 
(2012) (No. 11-502), 2011 WL 5014761, at *i; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Doninger 
v. Niehoff, 565 U.S. 976 (2011) (No. 11-113), 2011 WL 3151990, at *i; see also Bell v. 
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
1166 (2016); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
565 U.S. 1173 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (noting that the Supreme Court has not clearly opined on the authority of 
schools to regulate student off-campus speech), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012) 
(consolidating Snyder with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650 
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), whereby the Snyder-Layshock single denial of certiorari might 
technically be considered denial on two cases, bringing total certiorari denials on 
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this pressing question, based on an analysis of the leading federal 
cases involving off-campus speech impacting the school 
environment, which increasingly involve cyberbullying. Scholars 
and public policy experts have posited various definitions of 
cyberbullying. Like traditional bullying, cyberbullying has been 
described as “intentional aggressive behavior . . . repeatedly 
[directed at] the same target.”4 The Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention further characterized this form of “electronic 
aggression” as an “emerging public health problem.”5 This Article 
adopts the plain-language definition scholars Sameer Hinduja and 
Justin W. Patchin use: cyberbullying is “willful and repeated harm 
inflicted through the use of computers, cell phones, or other 
electronic devices.”6 
The issue was so new and unsettled that as of mid-July 2011, 
the federal circuit level courts had decided only four cases on the 
matter,7 followed quickly by another in late July8 and one on 
August 1st9 of that year. Since then, just three additional federal 
appeals court decisions have addressed this issue.10 The circuit 
                                                                                                             
cyberbullying since October 2011 to five); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011); ARTHUR S. HAYES, MASS MEDIA LAW: THE 
PRINTING PRESS TO THE INTERNET 49 (2013) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s repeated 
declining of certiorari on this issue, “leaving school administrations to look to their state 
or federal district or appeals courts for guidance”). 
4 Raúl Navarro et al., The Impact of Cyberbullying and Social Bullying on Optimism, 
Global and School-Related Happiness and Life Satisfaction Among [Ten to Twelve]-
Year-Old Schoolchildren, 10 APPLIED RES. QUALITY LIFE 15, 16 (2015). 
5 DAVID-FERDON & HERTZ, supra note 2, at 4 (asserting that, in short, this is 
“probably” an emerging problem, but that this question cannot be answered definitively 
and warrants further research). 
6 Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Social Influences on Cyberbullying Behaviors 
Among Middle and High School Students, 42 J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 711, 711 (2013). 
7 See Samuel Butler, IV, The Summer of Clarity: What the Summer of 2011 Says 
About Student Speech Rights, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 84 (2012); Emily Gold 
Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials and the Limits 
of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 592 n.3 (2011) (listing Snyder, 
Layshock, Doninger, and Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007), 
which are all discussed later in this Article). Waldman is cited in the leading off-campus 
speech case, Snyder, 650 F.3d at 942, 947. 
8 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 565–67. This case is discussed further in Section IV.D. 
9 See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 754, 756–57 
(8th Cir. 2011). This case is discussed further in Section IV.H. 
10 See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2013); 
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773–74 (8th Cir. 
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courts are greatly conflicted in their treatment of student speakers, 
and the federal courts’ application of the First Amendment to 
legally indistinguishable fact patterns often seems arbitrary. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit protects an eighth 
grader’s right to craft a fake MySpace page to tell dozens of her 
classmates that her married principal is a bisexual sex addict with a 
small penis, whose child looks like a gorilla, and whose wife looks 
like a man.11 But in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the First Amendment provides no relief for a high school 
senior class secretary candidate whose online blog refers to school 
administrators as “douchebags” for cancelling a school concert she 
helped plan.12 Both decisions, and others discussed below, purport 
to apply Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District’s “material disruption” test13 to off-campus student speech, 
but the approaches and results vary widely.14 Reconciling these, 
and similar decisions, is impossible without a single, modern test 
that the courts can easily understand and apply. 
This Article’s purpose is to construct and apply such a test, 
which would be applicable only to disruptive off-campus speech 
targeting students.15 The Supreme Court has been willing to 
restrict otherwise protected speech and expression to protect 
minors where such restrictions would clearly violate the First 
Amendment if those restrictions were aimed at the protection of 
adults.16 The federal cases examining off-campus speech, while 
inconsistent in their reasoning, generally evince a greater 
willingness to relax First Amendment protections where the victim 
                                                                                                             
2012). Both these cases are discussed later in the Article; see also Bell v. Itawamba Cty. 
Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied,  
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
11 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920–21. 
12 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 339–40, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
565 U.S. 976 (2011). 
13 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–39 (1968) (upholding a law that 
punishes adults for selling “girlie” magazines to minors, despite the challenge that such 
non-obscene materials enjoy First Amendment protection if sold to adults); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 162–64, 170 (1944) (holding a child labor law banning 
street sales of religious publications by minor children did not violate the  
First Amendment). 
16 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636, 638; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
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of the off-campus speech is a minor student.17 This legal issue is 
particularly timely because of the explosion in the use of electronic 
communication devices and social media networks—and the 
attendant increase in cyberbullying—by students. These devices 
and networks do not respect or even acknowledge traditional 
physical schoolhouse boundaries, leaving government-run schools 
to apply rules of campus speech which never contemplated the new 
cyberspace reality. 
The proposed new standard is a modern refinement of the 
seminal Tinker test, but with greater clarity in the age of the 
Internet. It should improve notice and predictability for students, 
teachers, parents, principals, and administrators as to what kinds of 
internet-based communications they can validly target and punish. 
This Article is organized as follows: it first examines the 
foundational framework of Supreme Court cases where the student 
is speaking or expressing herself in school—the student speech 
cases.18 Second, it reviews and summarizes each federal circuit’s 
leading cases on off-campus speech,19 emphasizing the cyberbully 
cases. Third, this Article introduces and makes the argument for a 
uniform national standard, borrowing from the leading federal 
circuit opinions that offer guidance toward an emerging best-
practice judicial trend. This trend is captured in the “Tinker-
Cyberbully Test,” a proposed multi-part legal standard for courts to 
apply when reviewing public school discipline decisions against 
First Amendment scrutiny. Prior to this Article’s conclusion, the 
                                                                                                             
17 Compare, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding the discipline of a high school senior who created a cruel website aimed at a 
fellow student against a First Amendment challenge), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012), 
with J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(finding that the discipline of a middle schooler who created a cruel website aimed at the 
school’s principal violated the First Amendment), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012). 
18 This Article does not address speech by minors that lacks any arguable connection 
to the school environment. 
19 Several state courts have also wrestled with the problem of off-campus speech 
and/or cyberbully speech. See, e.g., People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 485 (N.Y. 
2014) (“Cyberbullying is not conceptually immune from government regulation, so we 
may assume . . . that the First Amendment permits the prohibition of cyberbullying 
directed at children, depending on how that activity is defined.”). Except where 
specifically noted for a narrow purpose, state court cases are not included in  
this discussion. 
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Tinker-Cyberbully Test is applied to six actual,  
representative cases.20 
I. CONTEXT: CYBERSPEECH AND OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH 
Without context, the potential regulation of off-campus speech 
might be viewed as a legal issue separate and distinct from the 
administrative regulation of cyberbullying. Indeed, there remain 
fact patterns confronting the courts which involve off-campus 
speech or expression which have nothing to do with the Internet or 
cyberspeech.21 But based on the leading teen-behavior research22 
and a review of the leading circuit cases,23 it appears that 
increasingly, the regulation of cyberbullying and off-campus 
speech are inextricably linked. To be sure, a disruptive print 
newspaper or similar content can still be created off-campus then 
                                                                                                             
20 This Article does not address constitutional limits on off-campus student speech 
giving rise to criminal sanctions, including criminal cyberbullying, harassment, hate 
crime, and similar prohibitions. This Article further does not address in detail the issue of 
financial liability for public schools when a student takes his or her own life despite 
notice to the school of cyberbullying, nor personal liability for teachers or school 
administrators who allegedly violate the First Amendment rights of student speakers 
under color of law or violations of Title IX for alleged failure of schools to protect 
students from gender-based cyberbullying. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (providing that 
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance”). 
21 See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(addressing a drawing made at home two years prior that inadvertently made its way to 
school by its author’s younger brother); see also Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584,  
585–86 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing a petition to remove a high school coach that was 
“typed” by one player and eventually signed by eighteen players, although it is unclear 
whether any of the players’ relevant acts took place off campus). 
22 A seminal study on student use of teen social media released April 2015 found that 
ninety-two percent of teens—defined as ages thirteen to seventeen—report going online 
at least daily, more than half (fifty-six percent) go online several times a day, and about a 
quarter (twenty-four percent) self-report that they are on the Internet “almost constantly.” 
See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA & 
TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 2015: SMARTPHONES FACILITATE SHIFTS IN COMMUNICATION 
LANDSCAPE FOR TEENS 2 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-
media-technology-2015/ [https://perma.cc/J72J-AUSM]. 
23 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing a student who was suspended for creating a fake web page claiming 
classmate had herpes and advanced a First Amendment defense to discipline), cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012). 
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physically carried to campus,24 and bullies still shout insults as 
they follow kids home from school.25 But in the age of the Internet, 
it seems the law of off-campus speech regulation and the 
administrative law regulating cyberbullying have merged. Thus, 
this Article treats these two challenges as one—to the extent 
practical—in search of a single solution. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology applied in researching this Article is to locate 
and review the leading federal circuit court off-campus student 
speech cases involving a First Amendment challenge to school 
administrative punishment; group those cases by precedential 
value within their respective federal circuits;26 and glean from 
those decisions (along with their concurring and dissenting 
opinions) the most logical, broadly applicable, and sustainable 
policy precepts guiding the courts in the absence of U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent. 
III. MINORS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. A Preface on Cyberbullying 
Cyberbullying frequently occurs among minors, likely because 
bullies can remain anonymous and more easily engage in 
cyberbullying as compared to traditional “schoolyard” bullying.27 
The Internet provides a “distancing effect” that often leads 
cyberbullies to do and say crueler things than a schoolyard bully.28 
A communication does not need to be made to a victim to 
                                                                                                             
24 See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998). 
25 See, e.g., C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2016). 
26 Where no appellate court authority exits, special effort was made to locate and 
review well-reasoned district court opinions. A few particularly well-reasoned state court 
cases are discussed because they so closely framed the issue posed in this Article, 
because of the quality of the particular court’s analysis, or both. 
27 See, e.g., Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, State Legislation Mandating School 
Cyberbullying Policies and the Potential Threat to Student’s Free Speech Rights, 33 VT. 
L. REV. 283, 287–88 (2008). 
28 Richard Donegan, Bullying and Cyberbullying: History, Statistics, Law, Prevention 
and Analysis, 3 ELON J. UNDERGRADUATE RES. COMM. 33, 34 (2012). 
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constitute cyberbullying.29 A communication need only be about 
the victim.30 
B. The First Amendment and Minors Generally 
Speech in America is presumed protected by the First 
Amendment, unless some far greater constitutional or policy 
concern overrides this interest.31 This principle, so inviolate when 
applied to adults, often yields to more paternalistic impulses when 
applied to minors.32 The Supreme Court has noted: “The 
schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to 
experience the power of government.”33 However, minors are 
accorded only a portion of the First Amendment protections and 
liberties afforded to adults.34 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted the U.S. Constitution over a series of cases to construct 
what is essentially a separate and distinct First Amendment for 
minors and schoolchildren in America.35 
                                                                                                             
29 See BARBARA GUZZETTI & MELLINEE LESLEY, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON THE 
SOCIETAL IMPACT OF DIGITAL SCIENCE 536–37, 542 (2015). 
30 See Raychelle Cassada Lohmann, Cyberbullying Versus Traditional Bullying, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (May 14, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/teen-
angst/201205/cyberbullying-versus-traditional-bullying [https://perma.cc/9XKT-XVLR]. 
31 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (“Where First 
Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue 
always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at 
stake in the particular circumstances shown.”). Unprotected areas of speech are “of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
572 (1942)). 
32 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (“Because of the State’s 
exigent interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can 
exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by 
barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults.” 
(quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966))). 
33 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
34 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (“The state’s authority over 
children’s activities is broader than over like actions of adults.”). 
35 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (holding materials such 
as banners advocating illegal drug use can be banned and punished when displayed by 
students at school-related events, even if off-campus); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263, 271, 273 (1988) (upholding censorship that prevented a 
school newspaper bearing the imprimatur of school from including articles on pregnancy, 
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There appear to be two distinct, though related, categories of 
Supreme Court cases governing freedom of speech and expression 
of Americans who have not yet reached adulthood. The first group 
of cases involves the protection of minors, which might be called 
the “child protection cases.”36 The second group arises where the 
minor is the actual speaker and attends a public elementary or high 
school, the so-called “student speech cases.”37 The child protection 
cases include, without limitation, Prince v. Massachusetts,38 
Ginsberg v. New York,39 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,40 and 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.41 The leading 
student speech cases are West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette,42 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
                                                                                                             
birth control, and divorce, so long as such censorship was based on some “legitimate 
pedagogical concerns”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78, 686 
(1986) (holding lewd and sexually suggestive speech by student at a school assembly 
could be banned and punished with suspension despite a First Amendment challenge); 
Prince, 321 U.S. at 160–64, 170 (holding a child labor law banning street sales of 
religious publications by minor children did not violate the First Amendment). 
36 See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (concerning 
state law restricting sale of violent video games to minors); Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–14 (1975) (considering appellee’s argument that, in 
interest of protecting minors, city ordinance does not violate First Amendment); 
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (concerning state law prohibiting sale of obscene material to 
minors under seventeen years of age); Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (concerning state child labor 
laws directed at minors selling religious material). 
37 See generally Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (concerning high school student’s off-campus 
speech online); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (concerning censorship of a high school 
newspaper); Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (concerning sanctions against student for student’s 
language during nominating speech at high school assembly); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (concerning school district’s ban on 
wearing armbands to protest the “Vietnam hostilities” to school); W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (concerning board of education’s resolution that 
state’s public schools obligate students to salute the flag or face action  
for insubordination). 
38 321 U.S. 158 (holding a child labor law banning street sales of religious publications 
by minor children did not violate the First Amendment). 
39 390 U.S. 629. 
40 422 U.S. 205 (finding a Jacksonville ordinance criminalizing the showing of films 
with nudity if visible from a public area invalid, and rejecting that the rationale for such 
decision was protection of children). 
41 131 S. Ct. at 2742 (holding a statute criminalizing the sale of violent video games to 
children void). 
42 319 U.S. 624. 
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District,43 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,44 Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,45 and Morse v. Frederick.46 
For purposes of this analysis, the child protection cases are 
largely distinguishable from the student speech cases for two 
reasons. First, the student speech cases are adjudged to have taken 
place within the context of the school’s broadly-defined 
educational mission—generally on school property or at least at 
school-sanctioned events.47 Second, in the student speech cases, 
the speaker for First Amendment purposes is the student herself, 
not a parent, guardian, or merchant who is being regulated or 
banned from providing some speech or expression-related content 
to a minor.48 
C. The First Amendment and the Child Protection Cases 
The U.S. Supreme Court found the protection of children is an 
“exigent interest” of the government, worthy of material 
adjustment of standard First Amendment protections American 
adults take for granted.49 With mixed results, a number of cases 
have tested the authority of government—consistent with the First 
Amendment—to punish adults for: having children sell magazines 
after a government-imposed restriction,50 exposing passerby 
children to lewd scenes from a drive-in movie,51 selling lewd but 
                                                                                                             
43 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
44 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
45 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
46 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
47 See, e.g., id. at 396. 
48 See generally, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) 
(regarding sale of video games to a minor); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205 (1975) (regarding, inter alia, showing of films to minors); Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (regarding sale of obscene material to minors); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (regarding use of children to sell religious material). 
49 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636, 638 (“[W]e have recognized that even where there is 
an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the conduct of 
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’” (quoting Prince, 321 
U.S. at 170)). The constitutional rights of adults are not automatically comparable to the 
constitutional rights of children. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339–42 (1985). 
50 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (finding the statute valid). 
51 See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211–12 (finding the statute prohibited showing films 
containing nudity where passersby may view them invalid). 
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not obscene material to kids,52 or selling otherwise legal, but 
violent video games to kids.53 The following subsections will 
provide a more complete analysis of these cases. 
1. Ginsberg v. New York 
The Supreme Court has long held that special circumstances 
and an exigent interest allow incursions into normal First 
Amendment-protected activity that would be anathema to such 
constitutional guarantees were the actor an adult.54 Thus, in 
Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court found that criminal 
penalties outlawing the sale of non-obscene “girlie” magazines to 
minors did not violate the First Amendment.55 
The Court, after reviewing a New York statute outlawing the 
sale of sexually explicit material that could be legally sold to 
adults, concluded that it could not “say that the statute invade[d] 
the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to 
minors.”56 The Ginsberg Court, in expressly rejecting an argument 
based upon the First Amendment rights of minors,57 concluded that 
section 484-h of the New York Penal Code58 did not violate the 
                                                                                                             
52 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642–43 (finding the statute prohibiting selling lewd but 
not obscene materials to children valid and reasoning: “We therefore cannot say that § 
484-h, in defining the obscenity of material on the basis of its appeal to minors under 
[seventeen], has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors  
from harm.”). 
53 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742 (finding the statute prohibiting otherwise legal, but 
violent video games to kids invalid because “as a means of assisting concerned parents it 
is seriously overinclusive because it abridges the First Amendment rights of young 
people whose parents (and aunts and uncles) think violent video games are a  
harmless pastime”). 
54 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (“The State also has an independent interest in the 
well-being of its youth.”); Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (holding that a state prohibition on 
child sales of religious literature applied to boys under twelve and girls under eighteen 
did not violate the First Amendment). 
55 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643. 
56 Id. at 637. 
57 The court rejected First Amendment arguments advancing the speech or expression 
rights of minors based on Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See id. at 637; see 
also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 656 (1943) (citing Pierce v. 
Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)); Pierce, 
268 U.S. at 534–35. 
58 Section 484-h of the New York Penal Code made it a crime “knowingly to sell . . . 
to a minor” under seventeen years of age: “(a) any picture . . . which depicts nudity . . . 
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First Amendment in that it “simply adjusts the definition of 
obscenity ‘to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type 
of material to be assessed in term[s] [sic] of the sexual 
interests . . .’ of such minors.”59 In reasoning that the “State . . . has 
an independent interest in the well-being of its youth,”60 the Court 
noted that it is “altogether fitting and proper for a state to include 
in a statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children 
special standards, broader than those embodied in legislation 
aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to adults.”61 
2. Prince v. Massachusetts 
The Ginsberg Court favorably cited Prince v. Massachusetts 
multiple times,62 notably for the proposition that “the State has an 
interest ‘to protect the welfare of children’ and to see that they are 
‘safeguarded from abuses’ which might prevent their ‘growth into 
free and independent well-developed men.’”63 While some 
contrary authority exists in this area,64 the Court has also held that 
a ban on otherwise protected First Amendment activity, such as 
street newspaper sales by children, does not violate the  
First Amendment.65 
                                                                                                             
and which is harmful to minors,” and “(b) any . . . magazine . . . which contains . . . [such 
pictures] . . . and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 
633 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (1909) (current version at 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney 2017))). 
59 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502,  
509 (1966)). 
60 Id. at 640. 
61 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312 (1965)  
(Fuld, J., concurring). 
62 Id. at 638–39 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)). 
63 Id. at 640 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 165). 
64 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011) (holding the 
California Act violated the First Amendment because it did “not adjust the boundaries of 
an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for adults 
is not uncritically applied to children”). The California ban on the sales of violent video 
games was struck down on the grounds that the law attempted to craft medium-specific 
rules to govern video games, which offended traditional First Amendment principles. See 
id. at 2742. 
65 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (“[T]he power of the state to control the conduct of 
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is true in the case of 
other freedoms, and the rightful boundary of its power has not been crossed in  
this case.”). 
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3. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the U.S. Supreme Court 
employed content-discrimination analysis to invalidate a city 
ordinance outlawing the display of nudity in movies if visible from 
a public street, or “places where the offended viewer readily can 
avert his eyes,” such as those displayed in drive-in theaters.66 The 
rationale, ultimately rejected by the Court, was the protection of 
children.67 The statute failed because it made arbitrary content-
based distinctions between non-obscene films with and  
without nudity.68 
4. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association 
In Brown, the Electronic Merchants Association—a trade 
group representing video game and software manufacturers—
preemptively sued the State of California to challenge a law 
restricting the sale of violent video games to minors.69 The State of 
California argued that Ginsberg should control its video game 
child protection statute,70 and therefore, the court should uphold 
the statute based on the same “adjust the boundaries” theory.71 
However, the Court rejected this argument, distinguishing 
Ginsberg on the theory that obscenity is a category of unprotected 
speech with a long history of regulation,72 unlike exposure to 
depictions of violence.73 The Court stated: “Because speech about 
violence is not obscene, it is of no consequence that California’s 
statute mimics the New York statute regulating obscenity-for-
minors that we upheld in Ginsberg . . . .”74 However, the Court left 
room for analogous “adjust the boundaries” arguments to protect 
                                                                                                             
66 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975). 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 213–14. 
69 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732–33. 
70 See id. at 2735. California prohibited the sale or rental of “violent video games” to 
minors, and required that their packaging and labeling be labeled “18.” CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 1746.1–1746.2 (West 2017). The state statute, purporting to describe “violent video 
games,” imposed a civil fine of up to one thousand dollars for their illegal sale to minors.  
See id. § 1746.3. 
71 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735. 
72 See id. at 2735–36. 
73 See id. at 2735. 
74 Id. 
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children in areas where speech restrictions are based on tradition or 
“historical warrant.”75 
In analyzing the California video game statute, the Brown 
Court relied upon its reasoning in United States v. Stevens, which it 
distinguished from Ginsberg because “[t]here was no American 
tradition of forbidding” depictions of animal cruelty, which the 
statute in Stevens aimed to forbid.76 Instead, the Brown court 
reasoned that only those categories of speech with a “tradition of 
proscription” could be held to the more restrictive child-protection 
First Amendment standards advanced by Ginsberg.77 The 
“historical warrant” or “American tradition of forbidding” 
obscenity justified the variable or “adjust[ed]” standard for 
children without running afoul of the First Amendment.78 Hence, 
the Brown court rejected this argument because depictions of 
violence enjoy no such status as a historical exception to the  
First Amendment.79 
D. The First Amendment and the Student Speech Cases 
Five U.S. Supreme Court cases define the First Amendment 
rights and allowable governmental restrictions on public primary 
and secondary school students who attend kindergarten through 
twelfth grade. This Article refers to them as the student speech 
cases,80 and discusses each below. Governments have long 
attempted to restrict the speech of students, and in fact, have 
frequently curtailed speech in schools that the First Amendment 
would clearly protect if uttered by adults elsewhere. These five 
cases, discussed in chronological order, with varying levels of 
discussion based on their impact and ongoing legal  
significance, are: 
                                                                                                             
75 See id. at 2734–35. 
76 Id. at 2734; see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (finding that 
a federal statute purporting to criminalize the creation, sale, or possession of certain 
depictions of animal cruelty violates the First Amendment, because no historical warrant 
or tradition exists for banning depiction of such acts). 
77 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. 
78 Id. at 2734–35. 
79 Id. at 2736–37. 
80 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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1. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette: No Forced 
Political Student Speech 
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette—the first 
major student speech case—members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
religious faith brought suit for a declaratory judgment on behalf of 
their children to invalidate a state law requiring that students recite 
the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the American flag.81 The Court 
ruled that the government, acting through school districts, 
administrators, and teachers, cannot compel a student to make a 
political pledge with which the student disagrees.82 
2. Tinker’s ‘Disruption’ Standard Governs Student Speech ‘in 
class or out of it’83 
The second, and still most impactful, of the big five student 
speech cases is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held: “First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students . . . . 
This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 
[fifty] years.”84 
Handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969 during the 
Vietnam War, Tinker stands for the proposition that passive, non-
disruptive, symbolic, political speech—such as wearing black 
armbands—is protected by the First Amendment, and cannot be 
banned or punished by the student’s local public school or by the 
government.85 In Tinker, three Des Moines public schoolchildren 
                                                                                                             
81 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 627–29 (1943). 
82 See id. at 642. 
83 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
84 Id. at 506 (“[T]his Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents States from forbidding the 
teaching of a foreign language to young students. Statutes to this effect, the Court held, 
unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent.” (first citing 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); then citing Bartels v. Iowa,  
262 U.S. 404 (1923))). 
85 See id. at 504–06. Because the Tinker facts and holding arose in the context of a 
traditional local school district serving primary and secondary school students, the 
applicability of Tinker’s holding to public colleges remains open. See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,  
273 n.7 (1988)). 
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decided to fast for two days in December 1965 and wear black 
armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War.86 School district 
officials became aware of the plan, and passed an administrative 
rule requiring schools to ask any student wearing such an armband 
to remove it.87 The policy called for the suspension of any student 
who refused until the student returned to school without the 
armband.88 The Court repeated the oft-quoted proposition that “[i]t 
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”89 In finding in favor of the students, the court 
left unprotected only such student-based speech that “in class or 
out of it . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”90 This Article accepts 
the view of Judge (now Justice) Alito, who wrote that “[t]he 
precise scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of others’ 
language is unclear.”91 Therefore, it is presumed that the 
“interference” prong is incorporated into the “substantial 
disturbance” concept for which Tinker is generally known. One 
could argue that subsequent cases in this area have vigorously 
enforced Tinker’s authority on behalf of student speakers who 
communicate passively and non-disruptively.92 Federal courts 
widely interpret Tinker to imply a “reasonable likelihood” of 
disruption component, thus allowing schools to discipline students 
prior to the occurrence of actual disruption.93 
                                                                                                             
86 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 506. 
90 Id. at 513 (emphasis added). 
91 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001). 
92 See generally Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 
2014) (upholding school district’s demand that students remove apparel displaying the 
American flag because students doing so regularly sparked fights with other students); 
Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding school 
district’s demand that student remove apparel displaying the Confederate flag because of 
the unique racial tensions between black and white students in that district); Jacobs v. 
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a viewpoint neutral and 
content neutral dress code). 
93 See, e.g., J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 
989 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding first, the First Amendment “does not require school officials 
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3. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: School “Within 
Its Permissible Authority” When Sanctioning Lewd Speech 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,94 the third major 
student speech case, was handed down in 1986—two years before 
Hazelwood. In Bethel, a student speaker, while nominating another 
student for elective office at the school, repeatedly used lewd and 
sexually suggestive language, generally attached to some double 
meaning.95 The court found that the language at issue was “an 
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”96 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, who wrote the majority opinion, 
stated the issue simply: “We granted certiorari to decide whether 
the First Amendment prevents a school district from disciplining a 
high school student for giving a lewd speech at a school 
assembly.”97 The Court concluded that it does not.98 In reversing 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court 
restated Tinker, and distinguished an expansive, erroneous reading 
of that case from a more appropriate and accurate one: “[I]n 
Tinker, this Court was careful to note that the case did ‘not concern 
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the 
rights of other students.’”99 The Fraser Court concluded that 
exposure to lewd and indecent speech did indeed impinge on the 
rights of other student listeners, holding “that [a school district] 
acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing 
                                                                                                             
to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act. ‘In fact, they have a duty to 
prevent the occurrence of disturbances,’” and that second, “Tinker does not require 
certainty that disruption will occur, ‘but rather the existence of facts which might 
reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption’” (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973))); see also Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 514 (discussing school district’s burden to “demonstrate any facts which 
might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption”  
(emphasis added)). 
94 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
95 See id. at 677–80. 
96 Id. at 677–78. 
97 Id. at 677. 
98 See id. at 680. 
99 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,  
508 (1969)). 
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sanctions upon [a student speaker] in response to his offensively 
lewd and indecent speech.”100 
But Fraser should be read narrowly for many reasons. First, 
according to Justice Brennan’s concurrence, its holding is limited 
to high school assemblies.101 Second, its holding technically only 
applies to “disruptive language” at such assemblies.102 Third, 
Fraser has been criticized for use of the term “captive audience” to 
describe the student assembly, without providing clear definition 
or guidance for lower courts.103 
4. Hazelwood’s ‘Tolerate’ Versus ‘Promote’ Student  
Speech Distinction 
Tinker was substantially modified in 1988 by the fourth of the 
five major student speech cases, Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.104 Hazelwood made the constitutionally significant 
distinction between Tinker-governed student speech, which the 
First Amendment requires government schools to “tolerate,” versus 
speech that implies a government-school endorsement, such as the 
content of a public school newspaper.105 The case centered on a 
public school-sponsored student newspaper called “Spectrum.”106 
Three former high school students who were staffers on 
“Spectrum” sued the school district and school officials, alleging 
that the principal’s decision to censor two pages based on content 
                                                                                                             
100 Id. at 685. 
101 See id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Thus, the Court’s holding concerns only 
the authority that school officials have to restrict a high school student’s use of disruptive 
language in a speech given to a high school assembly.”). 
102 Id. 
103 See, e.g., Erica Salkin, Are Public School Students “Captive Audiences?” How an 
Unsupported Term in Fraser Created a “Mischievous Phrase” in Educational Speech 
Law, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 35, 35–37 (2015). 
104 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
105 See id. at 270–71 (“[T]he question that we addressed in Tinker . . . is different from 
the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote 
particular student speech. The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a 
student’s personal expression that happens to occur on school premises. The latter 
question concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical 
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”). 
106 See id. at 262. 
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violated their First Amendment rights.107 The principal cut an 
article describing school students’ experiences with pregnancy, and 
another article discussing the impact of divorce on students at the 
school.108 The principal objected to the pregnancy story because 
the pregnant students—although not named—“might be 
identifi[ed] from the [con]text” and because he “believed that the 
article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were 
inappropriate for some of the younger students.”109 The U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the censorship decision because it was 
based upon “legitimate pedagogical concerns” for the students at 
Hazelwood East.110 The Hazelwood Court made no Tinker-style 
inquiry into whether publication of the censored content would 
have been disruptive or interfered with the rights of  
other students.111 
Hazelwood also stands for the proposition that the First 
Amendment will not protect student speech that appears to carry 
the school’s endorsement—that is, speech which “might 
reasonably [be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.”112 The specific examples the Court used in Hazelwood 
justifying censorship were “school-sponsored publications, 
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities.”113 The 
Third Circuit rejected a version of this theory in Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District.114 The school in Layshock 
theorized that a student, by cut-and-paste copying his principal’s 
photo from the district’s website, gave rise to a trespass as if he 
had “broken into the principal’s office or a teacher’s desk.”115 A 
strict reading of the Hazelwood “imprimatur” rationale gives the 
school the discretion to regulate and ban “expressive activities that 
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably 
                                                                                                             
107 See id; see also id. at 273 (articulating the “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test, 
moving the boundary of limits on student speech rights). 
108 See id. at 263. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. at 273. 
111 See generally id. at 270–73. 
112 Id. at 271. 
113 Id. 
114 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011). 
115 Id. at 215. 
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perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”116 The 
“imprimatur,” or brand of the school, would surely not be 
associated with a fake web page or Facebook parody of another 
student, unless the cyberbully both used the school computer or 
network, and say, the school logo.    
While Tinker and Hazelwood are widely accepted as the 
“bookends” of student-speech law, the three other student speech 
cases also merit consideration and discussion. 
5. Morse v. Frederick: Opening the Door to Regulation of 
Off-Campus Speech 
Since 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court has only once tackled a 
pure student speech case: Morse v. Frederick,117 the fifth and final 
major case in this area. While the Morse case is generally known 
for the proposition that public schools may constitutionally 
regulate and ban on-campus speech advocating illegal drug use, it 
also stretches the boundaries of the meaning of “on-campus.”118 
Yet, that splintered and multi-voiced decision seems to have 
provided more questions than answers.119 In Morse, the Court 
found that the unfurling of a fourteen-foot banner, bearing the 
words “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” by a student at a school-related 
activity was unprotected speech.120 But the holding in Morse may 
merely be the framing, rather than the resolution, of the real 
question: In the wake of Morse and under the shadow of Tinker, 
what are the practical rules governing school administrators’ 
                                                                                                             
116 See id. at 213 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). 
117 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
118 See id. at 400–01, 408–10. 
119 See Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First 
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 380 n.152 (2007) (“However, the Court’s opinion also 
noted that ‘[t]he five separate opinions in Morse illustrate the plethora of approaches that 
may be taken in this murky area of law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 604 (W.D. Pa. 2007))); see also Joyce Dindo, 
Note, The Various Interpretations of Morse v. Frederick: Just a Drug Exception or a 
Retraction of Student Free Speech Rights?, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 201, 237 (2008) (“As one 
court described it, ‘[t]he five separate opinions in Morse illustrate the complexity and 
diversity of approaches to this evolving area of law.’” (quoting Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 
2d at 595)). 
120 Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those 
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal 
drug use.”). 
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ability to limit and punish student speech? What is the true 
meaning of Morse? Is the holding’s literal language the limit of the 
new constitutional ground the Court has plowed—that is, that 
student speech can be regulated and punished if it can “reasonably 
be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use”?121 The case includes 
a jurisprudential history lesson on the law of students and minors 
in Justice Clarence Thomas’ concurrence,122 as well as Justice 
Alito’s broadside concurrence aimed directly at a theory advanced 
by Morse’s counsel and the U.S. government: that the First 
Amendment allows public school officials to censor any student 
speech that “interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’”123 
Note well that Justice Alito has long been troubled by the potential 
overreach of the government’s interpretation of Tinker, particularly 
the “interference” prong that has received far less attention than the 
“disturbance” prong of Tinker’s holding.124 
The full decision in Morse also contains a hair-splittingly 
cautious opinion by Justice Breyer, who concurred in part and 
dissented in part, because he believed that granting qualified 
immunity to the principal, school, and district could resolve the 
case without reaching the underlying First Amendment question.125 
The bottom line is that six justices, based on their various Morse 
opinions, support a reading of the First Amendment which allows 
school districts to ban the advocacy of illegal drug use, so long as 
this conclusion is not extended to mean schools can ban any 
                                                                                                             
121 Id. See generally Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower 
Courts: Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2008); Charles Chulack, The First Amendment Does Not Require 
Schools to Tolerate Student Expression that Contributes to the Dangers of Illegal Drug 
Use: Morse v. Frederick, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 521 (2008). 
122 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410–22 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
123 Id. at 422–25 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting that case’s Brief for Petitioners). 
124 See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J., 
writing for the Majority) (“The precise scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of 
others’ language is unclear . . . .”). 
125 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(advocating a simple matter-of-law finding that the behavior of the school district in 
Morse did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known,” therefore giving rise to the winning defense of 
qualified immunity, thus barring Frederick’s First Amendment lawsuit (quoting Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). 
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behavior which interferes with the school’s mission.126 This 
limitation, which Justice Alito expressly demanded as a condition 
for his concurring vote, in some ways recasts and restates the 
“legitimate pedagogical concern” limitation of Hazelwood.127 
E. Summary of Student Speech Cases 
Nearly fifty years after it was handed down, Tinker is still the 
primary controlling law in the area of government regulation of 
student speech. The four other cases discussed above are best 
understood as exceptions to Tinker. Hazelwood means a student’s 
speech rights are limited if it appears he or she is speaking for the 
school. Barnette held that students have the right not to avow 
social/political beliefs with which they disagree. Fraser stands for 
the proposition that students have no right to make lewd or 
indecent comments at school gatherings of captive student 
audiences. Finally, the rule of Morse may be merely that student 
speech is unprotected if it advocates illegal drug use. 
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ ABILITY TO REGULATE OFF-
CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH 
Against this backdrop, a series of recent circuit court cases, and 
a smattering of federal district and state appellate court opinions, 
provide the most authoritative guidance for American jurists on the 
off-campus speech question. Moreover, these cases provide a 
blueprint of options available to the Supreme Court, should it 
eventually decide the internet-era boundaries of school jurisdiction 
over disruptive off-campus speech.128 
A. First Circuit: No Controlling Appellate Authority 
Research revealed no controlling internet era First Circuit 
authority balancing the First Amendment against the disciplinary 
                                                                                                             
126 See id. at 401, 410–22 (Thomas, J., concurring), 422–25 (Alito, J., concurring),  
425–33 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
127 See id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (criticizing the “interfere[nce] with a school’s 
‘educational mission’” standard and stating flatly that his concurring vote is premised 
upon the assumption that the full court rejects this concept (citation omitted)). 
128 See generally HAYES, supra note 3, at 49. 
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jurisdiction of public schools for off-campus activity. A LEXIS 
First-Circuit search of the words “Tinker v. Des Moines,” and a 
separate search of the numeric citation of Tinker, each returned 
sixteen cases since the year 2000.129 None of these cases were 
related to off-campus cyberspeech.130 The single relevant decision 
from within the First Circuit to off-campus speech involved an 
internet-related dispute between a public high school and the 
leader of a student group.131 In Bowler v. Hudson, a conservative 
student leader at a so-called “First Amendment School[]” was 
initially allowed to display a poster on school grounds listing an 
internet address from an affiliated national student group that 
featured links to savage beheadings as a means of opposing radical 
Islamic terrorism.132 School officials ordered the student leader to 
remove the internet address from the poster once the nature of the 
content on the national group’s website came to their attention.133 
Former and current students of the school sued, and the district 
court found that the First Amendment protected the student’s right 
to display the poster with the internet address.134 The court 
analogized the removal of the internet address—which could only 
be viewed off-campus because students’ ability to access the sites 
                                                                                                             
129 The last search was conducted July 29, 2016. 
130 See generally Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Pollack v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, No. 2:13-cv-109-NT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64611 (D. 
Me. Apr. 28, 2017); E.T. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of the Div. of Admin. Law 
Appeals, 169 F. Supp. 3d 221 (D. Mass. 2016); Berry v. RSU 13 Sch. Bd., 2:15-cv-
00146-JAW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23903 (D. Me. Feb. 24, 2016); Davidson v. City of 
Cranston, 42 F. Supp. 3d 325 (D.R.I. 2014); Pollack v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, 12 F. Supp. 
3d 173 (D. Me. 2014); Griswold v. Driscoll, 625 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Mass. 2009); 
Campbell v. Hooksett Sch. Dist., No. 07-cv-275-JL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10917 (D. 
N.H. Jan. 31, 2008); Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2007); 
Garcia v. Sanchez, No. 02-1646 (ADC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102320 (D.P.R. Aug. 15, 
2007); Governor Wentworth Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 410 
(D.N.H. 2006); Cole v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 350 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Me. 2004); 
S. Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 297 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass. 
2003); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003); Comfort v. 
Lynn Sch. Comm., 263 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Mass. 2003); Demers v. Leominster Sch. 
Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003); Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of 
Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003). 
131 See Bowler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 172–75. 
132 See id. at 172–73. 
133 See id. at 174–75. 
134 See id. at 171, 179–80. 
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themselves were blocked by school computers—to removal of 
books from a library, ultimately finding that the two cases were not 
akin to one another.135 
One other non-internet case bears mention. The First Circuit 
upheld a suspension of a student who brought a First Amendment 
challenge following off-campus creation and on-campus 
distribution of a written “Shit List” of derogatory comments and 
descriptions by students about students.136 The Donovan v. Ritchie 
court, unlike the panel in the Fifth Circuit case of Porter v. 
Ascension Parish School Board discussed below, did not take note 
of the distinction between off-campus (potentially) inadvertent 
transportation of offensive material versus intentional or 
foreseeable transmission.137 
B. Second Circuit: ‘Reasonably Foreseeable Risk’ Test for Off-
Campus Speech 
The Second Circuit’s general rule is that public schools can 
regulate off-campus cyberspeech under Tinker if there is “a 
reasonably foreseeable risk that [it] would come to the attention of 
school authorities and that it would ‘materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’”138 
In Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit rejected a student-
plaintiffs’ argument “that off campus speech could not be the 
subject of school discipline.”139 The court viewed the student’s 
                                                                                                             
135 See id. at 180. 
136 See Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1995). 
137 Compare id. at 18 (noting briefly students’ defense to their principal that the act 
occurred off-campus, but analyzing that issue no further), with Porter v. Ascension Par. 
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting the fact that student’s drawing at 
issue was introduced to the school accidentally). See generally infra Section IV.E for 
further discussion of Porter. 
138 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)). 
139 642 F.3d 334, 346 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 
1045–46 (2d Cir. 1979)) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument, which relied on the proposition 
that the Second Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court placed off-campus speech beyond the 
jurisdiction of school officials), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011); see also Boucher v. 
Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing a student-speaker who 
unsuccessfully cited Thomas for the proposition that schools lack jurisdiction in all cases 
over off-campus speech). 
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argument as overstating the holding of Thomas v. Board of 
Education, a seminal 1979 Second Circuit case standing for the 
proposition that student speech explicitly created and kept off 
campus should not be subject to school discipline.140 But 
foreshadowing the Tinker-related problems the Internet would 
bring, the Thomas court went on to say in dictum that it could 
“envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial 
disruption within the school from some remote locale.”141 
The speculation of the Thomas court in the fast-evolving world 
of online communications was validated in Wisniewski v. Board of 
Education.142 In Wisniewski, a public-school student used an 
instant messaging program to communicate with fellow students 
from his home computer.143 For a three-week period, whenever he 
sent an instant message, that message was accompanied by a 
crudely drawn icon depicting one of his teachers being shot in the 
head, with text below reading “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.”144 
Eventually, the student’s instant messages and the icon came to the 
attention of school officials, which led to a criminal investigation 
and required “special attention” of school officials—among other 
facets of “disruption” found by the court.145 
The Wisniewski court cited Morse and Thomas, among others, 
in determining that “[t]he fact that [the] creation and transmission 
of the IM icon occurred away from school property does not 
necessarily insulate [the student] from school discipline.”146 Where 
the icon’s off-campus display “pose[d] a reasonably foreseeable 
risk that [it] would come to the attention of school authorities 
and . . . ‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and 
discipline of the school,’” the student’s suspension for this display 
did not run afoul of the First Amendment.147 The court applied the 
Tinker standard because it was “reasonably foreseeable that the IM 
                                                                                                             
140 See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 346–47. 
141 Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17. 
142 494 F.3d 34. 
143 See id. at 35–36. 
144 Id. at 36. 
145 Id. at 36–37. 
146 Id. at 39. 
147 Id. at 38–39 (emphasis added) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.  
393, 403 (2007)). 
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icon would come to the attention of school authorities” and that it 
would “create a risk of substantial disruption.”148 The fact that the 
student did not create the icon on school property did not “insulate 
him from school discipline.”149 
Under Tinker, schools must have “a specific and significant 
fear of disruption, not just some remote apprehension of 
disturbance.”150 School officials do not need to wait until a 
disruption occurs.151 The majority in Wisniewski noted that one 
judge on their panel would hold that courts should only uphold 
school discipline of a student “for off-campus expression that is 
likely to cause a disruption on campus only if it was foreseeable to 
a reasonable adult.”152 
The foreseeability “perspective” question is not the most 
significant new issue highlighted by the Wisniewski opinion. The 
court’s decision also noted its disagreement with other circuit 
courts on the question of whether the criminal law “true threat” 
due process standard should apply to school suspensions and 
expulsions.153 The Wisniewski court decided that students did not 
have the right to hold school administrators to the same proof 
standard as law enforcement officials in Watts v. United States.154 
Therefore, unlike in Watts, a principal may punish a student simply 
by finding a reasonable likelihood of disruption under Tinker, as 
contrasted with the requirement to prove the student subjectively 
intended to threaten someone—or was at least reckless in 
communicating a message that might have been interpreted as a 
threat.155 This later approach, which again, conflicts sharply with 
                                                                                                             
148 Id. at 39–40. 
149 Id. at 39. 
150 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001). 
151 See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992). 
152 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 n.4 (emphasis added). 
153 See id. at 38. 
154 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (articulating true 
threat standard allowing criminal punishment only where a reasonable recipient of the 
speech would find that speech to be a serious expression of an intent to harm). 
155 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (holding that threatening 
statements are analyzed not from the perspective of the alleged victim, but by the intent 
of the maker of the alleged threat, and that to support a criminal conviction, the mindset 
of the speaker must be proven to evince a “true threat” which requires a certain level of 
mens rea or intent greater than negligence). 
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the Second Circuit’s Wisniewski analysis, holds schools to the true 
threat standard of Watts, and has been adopted by both the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits.156 
Thus arises the “Wisniewski” problem: If the student’s 
ridiculous juvenile humor has elements of parody cloaked in 
violence and there is no proof that he was not joking, can the 
school nonetheless punish him consistent with the First 
Amendment? Is the mere inclusion of the word “kill” enough 
where no reasonable adult would find the threat of violence? What 
if the police find that the student was joking and the threat was not 
legitimate, as was the case in the actual Wisniewski case?157 
The same court heard the case of Avery Doninger, a high 
school student involved in the planning of a student concert called 
“Jamfest,” which was postponed due to an adult’s scheduling 
conflict that came up after the event date had been set.158 When the 
school administrators suggested postponement, Ms. Doninger 
objected and launched an internet-based campaign to rally students 
to convince administrators to reverse the decision.159 When 
administrators refused, she referred to them in her blog as 
“douchebags,” and a campaign among fellow students continued to 
protest the decision,160 for which she received a reprimand and 
disqualification from running for student office.161 The Doninger 
court interpreted the Thomas dicta as “suggesting that such 
behavior, simply not present in the case before it, might 
                                                                                                             
156 See Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621–32 (8th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc); Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371–73  
(9th Cir. 1996). 
157 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36 (“[A] police investigator who interviewed Aaron 
concluded that the icon was meant as a joke, that Aaron fully understood the severity of 
what he had done, and that Aaron posed no real threat to VanderMolen or to any other 
school official. A pending criminal case was then closed. Aaron was also evaluated by a 
psychologist, who also found that Aaron had no violent intent, posed no actual threat, and 
made the icon as a joke.”). 
158 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 339 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 
976 (2011). 
159 See id. at 339–40. 
160 See id. at 340–41. 
161 See id. at 342. The student in the Doninger case also eventually led a student protest 
that consisted of wearing shirts stating “Team Avery” or “RIP Democracy” to the 
assembly for the election from which she was disqualified. See id. at 343. 
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appropriately be disciplined.”162 As a result, the Doninger court 
held that the student was not entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment.163 
C. Third Circuit: Tinker Reaches Off-Campus Speech 
The Third Circuit analyzes school jurisdiction over off-campus 
cyberbullying as a multi-part test, which sequentially applies the 
precedents from the major student speech cases.164 If the student 
speech is vulgar, lewd, and plainly offensive, it can be banned and 
is controlled by the teaching of Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser.165 Second, if a reasonable person would believe the student 
speech is made by or endorsed by the school, this “legitimate 
pedagogical concern” allows the school to ban the speech under 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.166 Third, if the student 
speech advocates illegal drug use, it can be banned under Morse v. 
Frederick.167 If the fact pattern cannot extend to fit any of these 
scenarios, Tinker controls and the student prevails, unless the 
school can demonstrate that school administrators could 
reasonably forecast either: (1) “that the students’ activities would 
materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school”168 or (2) “material interference with school activities.”169 
The court was disciplined in applying this approach, and was not 
swayed by the outrageousness of the J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain School District facts: To wit, an eighth grade school 
child is protected by the First Amendment after building a faux 
web-page ascribed to her principal, which insults him, his wife, his 
son, and lampoons his sexuality.170 In finding for the student, the 
Third Circuit noted that J.S. “took specific steps to make the 
profile ‘private’” and that the principal’s investigation of the 
                                                                                                             
162 Id. at 347. 
163 See id. at 357. 
164 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925–27 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012). 
165 See id. at 927. 
166 Id. 
167 See id. 
168 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
169 Id. at 514; accord Snyder, 650 F.3d at 926. 
170 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920–21. 
264       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:233 
 
matter, not the web page itself, created any “disruption” related to 
the incident.171 
The Third Circuit was busy on July 13, 2011, handing down 
not just Snyder, but also Layshock—employing similar reasoning 
to the difficult questions surrounding the ability of school 
administrators to punish cyberbullying.172 This Article treats 
Layshock summarily and analyzes Snyder in detail, which has 
richer facts, and appears to be the more nuanced and well-reasoned 
of the two cyberbullying cases.173 In Snyder, middle school student 
J.S. created a parody MySpace174 website which purported to be 
the profile of her principal McGonigle, though it did not identify 
him by name.175 J.S. used McGonigle’s official school website 
photo, and created a mock announcement which satirically listed 
“M-Hoe[‘s]” general interests as: “detention, being a tight ass, 
riding the fraintrain, spending time with my child (who looks like a 
gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking in my office, [and] 
hitting on students and their parents.”176 J.S. initially denied 
                                                                                                             
171 Id. at 930–31. 
172 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
173 The same Third Circuit en banc panel that splintered in Snyder on June 13, 2011, 
reached a unanimous fourteen-to-zero decision in Layshock, due apparently to the factual 
differences in the cases. A concurrence in Layshock, written by Judge Jordan and joined 
by Judge Vanaskie, reinforced the still-unresolved question of Tinker’s applicability to 
off-campus speech: “Unlike the fractured decision in [Snyder], we have reached a united 
resolution in this case, but there remains an issue of high importance on which we are 
evidently not agreed and which I note now, lest there be any misperception that it has 
been resolved by either [Snyder] or our decision here. The issue is whether the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, can be 
applicable to off-campus speech. I believe it can, and no ruling coming out today is to the 
contrary.” Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219–20 (Jordan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
174 MySpace is a “[s]ocial networking site that allows its users to create webpages to 
interact with other users. Users of the service are able to create blogs, upload videos and 
photos, and design profiles to showcase their interests. MySpace, BUSINESSDICTIONARY, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Myspace.html [https://perma.cc/N2B6-
XA35] (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). 
175 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929. 
176 Id. at 920. The school principal’s wife, Debra Frain, worked at the school as a 
guidance counselor and is the subject of several of the comedic insults posted on the 
Internet by J.S. See id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
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involvement, but eventually admitted authorship of the online 
parody, and the school suspended her for ten days.177 
In its de novo review of the district court’s grant of the school’s 
motion for summary judgment, the Third Circuit applied a 
checklist from the student speech precedents, including substantial 
school disruption, interference with the rights of others, and 
lewd/vulgar speech.178 The Snyder majority opinion cited Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell,179 and earlier concluded that the profile 
“though indisputably vulgar, was so juvenile and nonsensical that 
no reasonable person could take its content seriously, and the 
record clearly demonstrates that no one did.”180 The court also 
found no substantial disruption.181 A few teachers fielded student 
queries about the website, and one counselor lost twenty or thirty 
minutes when forced to sit in on a parent meeting related to the 
MySpace page.182 The court held that the speech was protected by 
the First Amendment,183 though this conclusion does not settle the 
matter of school jurisdiction over cyberbullies in the circuit. 
Weighing the student’s First Amendment rights against the 
alleged school disruption, the Third Circuit voted thirteen-to-six 
for the conclusion that the school lacked the authority to punish 
this particular student speech.184 It is noteworthy that five of the 
circuit’s judges signed on to the majority’s conclusion, but not its 
reasoning.185 The concurrence, written by Judge D. Brooks Smith 
and signed by Chief Judge Theodore McKee and three others, 
opined that Tinker does not reach off-campus speech at all.186 The 
                                                                                                             
177 See id. at 922. 
178 See id. at 926–27, 931 n.9. 
179 See id. at 931 n.9 (citing and summarizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988), which “h[eld] that a libel claim 
cannot survive where no reasonable observer can understand the statements to be 
describing actual facts or events”). 
180 Id. at 929. 
181 See id. at 928. 
182 See id. at 923. 
183 See id. at 931. 
184 See id. at 936. 
185 See id. at 936–41. 
186 See id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring) (“I write separately to address a question that 
the majority opinion expressly leaves open: whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech 
in the first place. I would hold that it does not, and that the First Amendment protects 
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dissent, signed by six Third Circuit judges, would have upheld 
J.S.’s suspension, granting her no First Amendment protection 
under Tinker because, as a factual matter, J.S.’s behavior did in 
fact disrupt her school with “vulgar, obscene, and personal 
language” directed at school officials.187 But more to the point of 
this Article and the overall cyberbullying debate, the dissent found 
that jurisdiction over such student speech does rest with the school 
under Tinker, just as the eight-judge majority opinion did.188 Judge 
D. Michael Fisher, disagreeing pointedly with the Snyder 
majority’s factual conclusion that J.S.’s words did not create a 
substantial disruption, noted in the dissent that the “Supreme Court 
has only briefly and ambiguously considered whether schools have 
the authority to regulate student off-campus speech.”189 Thus the 
six-vote dissent in Snyder, coupled with the eight votes for the 
majority, likely form the most societally and judicially important 
conclusion of Snyder. That conclusion is this: With the U.S. 
Supreme Court silent on the matter, fourteen of the nineteen Third 
Circuit judges—which this Article argues is the court with the 
broadest, most in-depth and credible treatment of the problem—
hold that schools in the internet era do have the authority under 
Tinker to regulate off-campus cyberbullying speech.190 
A recent post-script to Snyder comes from the federal district 
court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which found on 
October 5, 2017, that a junior varsity cheerleader was protected by 
the First Amendment against her high school’s attempts to 
discipline her for a social media photo in which she “and a friend 
h[eld] up their middle fingers with the [caption:] ‘fuck school fuck 
softball fuck cheer fuck everything.’”191 It is noteworthy that the 
Middle District Court of Pennsylvania read the Snyder Third 
                                                                                                             
students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens 
in the community at large.”). 
187 See id. at 936–41. 
188 See id. at 943 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the rule adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Tinker should determine the outcome of this case.”). 
189 Id. at 942 (citing Waldman, supra note 7, at 617–18). 
190 See generally Snyder, 650 F.3d 915 (noting agreement between the majority and 
dissent as to applying Tinker); supra notes 178–89 and accompanying text  
(noting same). 
191 See B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-1734, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 165177, at *1, *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2017). 
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Circuit decision to mean public schools lack the authority to punish 
off-campus speech if the punishment is based solely on the so-
called Fraser exception, which allows schools to punish “lewd or 
profane” speech.192 
D. Fourth Circuit: The Kowalski Test: ‘Nexus’ to ‘School’s 
Pedagogical Interests’ 
In the Fourth Circuit, the standard governing a public school’s 
ability to regulate or punish off-campus cyberbullying is: The First 
Amendment does not bar public school discipline or regulation 
where the “nexus” between the student’s speech and the 
“[s]chool’s pedagogical interests [is] sufficiently strong to justify 
the action taken by school officials.”193 
In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, Kara Kowalski, a high 
school senior in Berkeley County, West Virginia, created a website 
called “S.A.S.H.” from home that was dedicated to ridiculing a 
fellow student, Shay N.194 Ms. Kowalski claimed the initials of the 
site stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes,” although a 
classmate who participated in the cyberbullying admitted that the 
letters stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes.”195 Kowalski 
invited one-hundred people to join the MySpace group, and two 
dozen fellow students “joined” the electronic group, which allowed 
large groups of users to post pictures and make comments.196 The 
court found as a factual matter that Kara Kowalski’s principal 
motive in creating the MySpace page was ridiculing the fellow 
student.197 School administrators imposed a ten-day suspension 
and a ninety-day “social suspension” on Kowalski, later reduced 
after complaints from her parents, to a five-day suspension with a 
                                                                                                             
192 See id. at *7; see also Snyder 650 F.3d at 932 (“The School District’s argument fails 
at the outset because Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech.”). The Author notes 
that the Snyder opinion allows for an alternate reading, given that Fraser distinguishes 
punishable lewd student speech from speech outside of the school context. See id. at *6. 
A fair reading of the term “school context” could include school-related social media 
speech, in the Author’s opinion. See id. at *6–7. 
193 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
565 U.S. 1173 (2012). 
194 See id. at 567. 
195 Id. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 576. 
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ninety-day social suspension.198 The social suspension banned 
Kowalski from “school events in which she was not a direct 
participant.”199 Kowalski responded by suing the school and 
various officials, claiming, among other things, that the First 
Amendment and the student speech cases prohibit discipline of 
students where that speech is not connected to “school-related 
activity.”200 She argued that her speech was “private out-of- 
school speech.”201 
The Fourth Circuit rejected Kowalski’s arguments, framing the 
issue as follows: “The question thus presented is whether 
Kowalski’s activity fell within the outer boundaries of the high 
school’s legitimate interest in maintaining order in the school and 
protecting the well-being and educational rights of its students.”202 
The court concluded that it did.203 
E. Fifth Circuit: Tinker Reaches Off-Campus Speech 
The Fifth Circuit has recently held that Tinker applies to off-
campus speech, in the case of a foul-language rap song posted to 
Facebook.204 The court in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, 
sitting en banc, reinforced the notion that it would impose an intent 
standard on off-campus communications which school officials 
believe may disrupt campus activities.205 The Fifth Circuit relied 
heavily upon the reasoning of its 2004 opinion in the non-internet 
case Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board.206 In Porter, a 
student drew a crude sketch of his school under siege by a gasoline 
truck tanker, replete with racial epithets, a missile launcher, and a 
depiction of a brick being thrown at the school principal.207 The 
student, Adam Porter, then fourteen years old, showed the “siege” 
                                                                                                             
198 Id. at 569. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 567. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 571. 
203 See id. at 574. 
204 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
205 See id. at 391, 396. 
206 See id. at 394–96 (discussing Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th 
Cir. 2004)). 
207 See 393 F.3d at 611. 
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drawing to his mother, younger brother, and one other person in 
his home, and the drawing was then placed in a closet.208 The pad 
apparently remained there for two years until Adam’s younger 
brother, rummaging through the closet to find something to draw 
on, found the pad and used one of its other pages to draw a sketch 
of a llama.209 While riding a school bus, the brother showed the 
sketchpad with the llama to a fellow student who flipped through 
the pad and spotted Adam’s “siege” drawing, gave the pad to the 
bus driver, and said “Miss Diane, look, they’re going to blow up 
[our school].”210 
Adam was subsequently threatened with expulsion and sent to 
alternative school.211 He eventually returned to his former high 
school, but dropped out.212 On his behalf, his mother sued the 
school and the local school district, alleging, among other claims, 
violation of Adam’s First Amendment rights under the U.S. 
Constitution.213 The trial court granted summary judgment for the 
district and other defendants.214 Porter appealed, and the Fifth 
Circuit found in his favor on the First Amendment claim.215 The 
court’s reasoning was simple, elegant, and instructive for courts 
now deciding cases in the social media era. 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that Adam did not intentionally or 
knowingly communicate his drawing in a way sufficient to remove 
it from the protection of the First Amendment: “Because Adam’s 
drawing cannot be considered a true threat as it was not 
intentionally communicated, the state was without authority to 
sanction him for the message it contained.”216 The court noted that 
                                                                                                             
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 Id. 
211 See id. at 612. 
212 See id. 
213 See id. 
214 See id. at 613. 
215 See id. at 625 (disagreeing with district court’s finding concerning the First 
Amendment, but affirming on the alternate ground that only the challenge to summary 
judgment as it pertained to the principal was maintained, and the principal was entitled to 
qualified immunity). 
216 Id. at 618. Scholars have roundly criticized the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in the 
true-threat context for its lack of guidance to lower courts. See, e.g., W. Wat Hopkins, 
Cross Burning Revisited: What the Supreme Court Should Have Done in Virginia v. 
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the fact that “the introduction of the drawing to [the high school] 
was wholly accidental and unconnected with Adam’s earlier 
display of the drawing to members of his household is 
undisputed.”217 The court concluded that private writings enjoy the 
protection of the First Amendment, and losing such protection 
requires “something more than their accidental and unintentional 
exposure to public scrutiny.”218 The language of the Fifth Circuit 
on its face, then leaves open the possibility—indeed the 
likelihood—that private writings intentionally exposed to public 
scrutiny would lose their private character, and thus their presumed 
First Amendment protection.219 But the rule from the case, which 
might be called the Porter Rule, is that offensive speech 
inadvertently transmitted to the school environment is beyond the 
reach of school administrative discipline. 
The Bell court adopted the same “intent” reasoning: “Porter 
instructs that a speaker’s intent matters when determining whether 
the off-campus speech being addressed is subject to Tinker. A 
speaker’s intention that his speech reach the school community, 
buttressed by his actions in bringing about that consequence, 
supports applying Tinker’s school-speech standard to  
that speech.”220 
F. Sixth Circuit: Lowery Rule Leaves Anti-Coach Petitions 
Unprotected 
In the Sixth Circuit, the law of school jurisdiction over off-
campus speech is unsettled. Shortly before the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Doninger, the Sixth Circuit handed down Lowery v. 
Euverard, a non-internet case of off-campus student speech 
transmitted into the school environment.221 In Lowery, a group of 
football players signed a petition calling for the firing of their 
                                                                                                             
Black and Why It Didn’t, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 269, 314 (2004); John 
Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to 
Incitement that Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 212–13 (1999). 
217 Porter, 393 F.3d at 617. 
218 Id. at 617–18. 
219 See id. 
220 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
221 See 497 F.3d 584, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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football coach.222 The players intended to hold the petition until 
after the season, when Lowery, and perhaps others, would give it 
to the school principal in an attempt to get the coach replaced as 
head coach of the football team.223 The Lowery Court notes that a 
player “typed” the petition and that eighteen players “eventually 
signed” it, although the court is silent on whether these acts took 
place on campus or off.224 When the coach discovered the petition, 
he called the players in one by one and asked whether they were 
aware of the petition, whether they’d signed it, and whether they 
wanted to play football under the current coach.225 Those who 
answered “no” to the third question, and refused to apologize if 
they signed, were dismissed from the team.226 The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the school did not violate the players’ First 
Amendment rights.227 In rejecting the students’ First Amendment 
claim, the court noted that the players were free to continue trying 
to have the coach fired, but not as team members “actively 
working to undermine his authority.”228 
G. Seventh Circuit: District Court Presumes Tinker’s Reach in 
Teen Sexual Photos Posting Case 
In the Seventh Circuit, the law of school jurisdiction over off-
campus speech, including cyberbullying speech, is unclear.229 The 
                                                                                                             
222 Id. at 585–86. The opinion is silent on where the petition was drafted. See generally 
id. What is clear is that the Tinker analysis employed by the Lowery court did not rely on 
any presumption that the petition and player signings were done on campus. See 
generally id. (failing to examine whether the speech occurred on or off campus at all). 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis turns solely on the presumption of potential substantial 
disruption, and does not require as a condition precedent for discipline that the student 
speech have been uttered on-campus or at a school event. See generally id. (speaking 
neither of location on or off campus). 
223 See id. 
224 See generally id. 
225 Id. at 586. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. at 600–01. 
228 Id. at 600 (employing a Tinker-style disruption analysis). 
229 While research revealed no Seventh Circuit cases opining specifically on the post-
Tinker standard to be applied to off-campus speech transported to campus, the plaintiff in 
Boucher v. School Board tried unsuccessfully to make the argument for an off-campus 
analysis. See 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998). The Boucher court, however, found that 
because the underground newspaper at issue in the case was in fact distributed on campus 
and advocated behavior on campus, the off-campus analysis was unnecessary. Id. 
272       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:233 
 
circuit—employing somewhat circular reasoning—found that off-
campus speech deemed to be within the jurisdiction of school 
officials is de facto on-campus speech.230 This approach avoids any 
need to construct an analytical framework to determine when and 
under what circumstance, absent intentional physical transport onto 
the campus, such speech which originates off campus is subject to 
school jurisdiction. Research revealed no Seventh Circuit appellate 
cases adjudicating a public school district’s reach to  
off-campus speech. 
Still, one case from within the district provides some insight 
into what the Seventh Circuit might do with a cyberbullying matter 
of first impression.231 In T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green 
Community School Corp., an Indiana district court found that a 
school district violated the First Amendment rights of two students 
who “posed for some raunchy photos which they later posted 
online.”232 The photos, taken in a private home at a teen slumber 
party, were posted on social media websites Facebook, MySpace, 
and Photo Bucket, and eventually came to the attention of the 
school officials, who suspended the two students from 
participating in certain school activities.233 The teenage girls in the 
photos used a lollipop to mimic sex organs, simulated sex between 
the pajama-clad participants, and posted a photo with the 
accompanying words: “Wanna suck on my cock.”234 
After laying out the facts, Judge Philip P. Simon, Chief District 
Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, reasoned through an 
                                                                                                             
230 See id. In looking to the Seventh Circuit for direction in the absence of its own 
Eleventh Circuit’s guidance, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
reasoned that Boucher is part of a “line of early cases that have determined that student 
speech concerns are implicated when speech published off-campus is brought on-
campus.” Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2010). The case does 
not inquire into the method of transportation or the intent of the author of the speech.  
See generally id. 
231 See generally T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 
767, 774–85 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (discussing First Amendment concerns and applying 
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” analysis, while resorting to Third Circuit precedent J.S. 
Snyder, which the B.V. court determined to “assume[] without deciding that Tinker 
applied to the student’s off-campus” speech). 
232 Id. at 771, 790. 
233 See id. at 771–74. 
234 Id. at 772. 
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extensive First Amendment analysis, noting: “The Supreme Court 
has not considered whether Tinker applies to expressive conduct 
taking place off school grounds and not during a school activity 
and has in fact noted that ‘[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer 
boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech 
precedents.’”235 The B.V. court, following what it took to be the 
national trend, assumed that Tinker applies to off-campus speech, 
making it theoretically possible for the school to punish or ban the 
lewd behavior.236 In fact, however, the court found the girls’ silly 
faux-sex slumber party photos and posts were non-profane 
expressions of “crude humor,” and were thus protectable 
expression “within the ambit of the First Amendment.”237 Judge 
Simon wrote: “Ridiculousness and inappropriateness are often the 
very foundation of humor. The provocative context of these young 
girls horsing around with objects representing sex organs was 
intended to contribute to the humorous effect in the minds of the 
intended teenage audience.”238 Analysts reviewing B.V. should 
take care to note that the student in the case may have won the 
battle but lost the war. The court clearly found that the school had 
jurisdiction over the off-campus speech,239 and such a presumption 
is now a given among most federal courts.240 The B.V. court left 
little doubt that, on the appropriate facts, it could uphold a school 
suspension based on off-campus cyberspeech.241 
H. Eighth Circuit: Clear Support for School Discipline of Off-
Campus Speech 
In the Eighth Circuit, public primary and secondary schools 
clearly have administrative jurisdiction over off-campus 
                                                                                                             
235 Id. at 781 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007)  
(alteration in original)). 
236 See id. at 781 (“In the present context, I will also assume without deciding that 
Tinker applies, because even under its contextual narrowing of the right of free speech, I 
conclude that the school officials violated the First Amendment rights of plaintiffs T.V. 
and M.K.”). 
237 Id. at 776. 
238 Id. 
239 See id. at 781 (applying the Tinker standard). 
240 See generally infra Part V and accompanying text (discussing the application of 
Tinker among the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal). 
241 See B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 771–81. 
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cyberbullying. Two very different cases illustrate the views of the 
circuit. In D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District # 
60, a minor sent instant messages to a fellow student about 
bringing a gun to school, and about specific students and the types 
of students he would like to shoot.242 Reviewing only 
administrative action by the school, the Eighth Circuit discussed 
Tinker and its progeny, and noted: 
In none of these cases was the [Supreme] Court 
faced with a situation where the First Amendment 
question arose from school discipline exercised in 
response to student threats of violence or for 
conduct outside of school or a school sanctioned 
event. Such cases have been brought in the lower 
courts, however, and the courts of appeal have taken 
differing approaches in resolving them.243 
D.J.M. argued to the court that his speech was not “student speech” 
because it was made online and outside the school environment.244 
The court rejected this argument and upheld the suspension.245 
A year later, the Eighth Circuit heard S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. 
Lee’s Summit R-7 School District,246 a more traditional 
cyberbullying case. In Wilson, twin brothers set up a sexually 
explicit and racist blog which, according to the court, was 
“targeted at” the district’s high school.247 In rejecting the First 
Amendment challenge to the 180-day suspension brought by 
S.J.W.’s parents on behalf of their minor children, the Eighth 
Circuit considered and rejected the students’ argument that “all 
off-campus speech is protected and cannot be the subject of school 
discipline, even if the speech is directed at the school or  
specified students.”248 
                                                                                                             
242 See 647 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 2011). 
243 Id. at 761. 
244 Id. at 760 (“He also argues that his speech was not student speech because it was 
online outside of school.”). 
245 Id. at 765. 
246 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012). 
247 Id. at 775. 
248 Id. at 776. 
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I. Ninth Circuit: The Wynar Rule: Off-Campus Speech 
Punishable 
In the Ninth Circuit, off-campus messages are subject to public 
school administrative jurisdiction and punishment. In Wynar v. 
Douglas County School District,249 the Ninth Circuit found no First 
Amendment violation in the school’s discipline of a student 
following “increasingly violent and threatening” internet-
transmitted MySpace chat messages.250 These messages, for 
example, discussed raping girls’ dead bodies, hero worship of 
Adolph Hitler, and details of who to shoot and kill first on a “hit 
list” of students.251 The student, Landon Wynar, complained online 
that the Virginia Tech mass killer got too much notoriety for his 
killing spree:252 “[T]hat stupid kid from vtech. he didnt do shit and 
got a record. i bet i could get 50+ people / and not one bullet would 
be wasted.”253 The Wynar court, noting the lack of Supreme Court 
guidance, directly addressed the question of whether the First 
Amendment protects students from school discipline for off-
campus speech.254 To answer this question, the court said it would 
“look to our circuit precedent and to our sister circuits for 
guidance.”255 The court then engaged in a detailed analysis which 
expressly adopted Tinker’s “disruption or interference” standard, 
before concluding that the First Amendment does not insulate 
students from discipline for disruptive off-campus speech, or 
speech which interferes with the rights of other students.256 
In a 2016 case, the Ninth Circuit clarified that off-campus 
speech jurisdiction is not premised upon the risk of violence. In a 
well-reasoned decision based on facts not involving cyberspeech, 
the Ninth Circuit in C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene School District 
4J, analyzed the leading off-campus speech cases from the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits to hold that student-to-student verbal 
sexual harassment which occurred “several hundred feet” from 
                                                                                                             
249 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
250 See id. at 1064–65, 1067–72. 
251 See id. at 1065–66. 
252 See id. at 1066. 
253 Id. 
254 See id. at 1067. 
255 Id. 
256 See id. at 1067–72. 
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campus is indeed subject to school regulation under Tinker.257 The 
court employed a nexus-to-school/foreseeability analysis 
developed by the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski.258 Thus, although this 
Article relies heavily upon the premise that in the internet era, 
much of the off-campus Tinker analysis becomes conflated with a 
discussion of cyberbullying, the facts and reality of traditional 
bullying remain a concern for schools and the courts. 
J. Tenth Circuit: No Controlling Case Authority 
There is no controlling Tenth Circuit authority on the ability of 
schools to administratively punish off-campus speech. However, 
one unpublished decision from a district court within the Tenth 
Circuit is noteworthy because it reinforces the Fifth Circuit holding 
in Porter. In D. G. v. Independent School District No. 11, the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, in an 
unpublished case, overturned the suspension of a student who 
wrote a poem containing such words as “Killing Mrs. [Teacher]” 
and “I hate this class it is hell.”259 The poem was never 
communicated to the teacher and, based on the factual record, it 
appears the discovery of the poem was completely inadvertent.260 
The court’s approach was to first analyze the facts under a 
modified version of Watts—would a reasonable person believe the 
message would communicate a serious intent to harm?261 Then, the 
court applied a standard Tinker analysis: was the speech materially 
disruptive?262 The court answered both questions in the negative 
and ordered the student reinstated in school.263 
                                                                                                             
257 See C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1147, 1152–55 (9th Cir. 2016). 
258 See id. at 1149–52 (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573  
(4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012)). 
259 See No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *3, *19 (N.D. Okla.  
Aug. 21, 2000). 
260 See id. at *3–7. 
261 See id. at *11–13. 
262 See id. at *14–15. 
263 See id. at *18–19. 
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K. Eleventh Circuit: District Court Protects Student-Critic  
of Teacher 
There is no controlling Eleventh Circuit authority on the issue 
of school jurisdiction over off-campus speech. The federal district 
court in the Southern District of Florida, however, wrestled 
comprehensively with the special issues raised in the modern 
internet era in Evans v. Bayer.264 In Evans, a student created a 
group on Facebook, a social networking website, entitled, “Ms. 
Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met” and was 
disciplined.265 The Evans court discussed the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach in Boucher, which construed off-campus speech as 
automatically converted to on-campus speech when it reaches 
campus and disrupts the campus environment.266 Despite noting 
that this approach “is not as easily suited to intangible situations 
like the [I]nternet,” the Evans court nonetheless predicted that 
“ultimately some guise of it will control.”267 
The Evans court found the speech was off-campus speech, but 
that “schools can discipline off-campus speech if it is unprotected 
speech.”268 The student’s creation of the website was a non-
disruptive, non-threatening opinion, and was not prohibited by any 
other free-speech exception—such as lewdness or advocacy of 
illegal action—and thus protectable under the First Amendment.269 
L. D.C. Circuit: No Controlling Appellate Authority 
There is no controlling D.C. Circuit authority on the ability of 
schools to administratively punish off-campus speech. 
                                                                                                             
264 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
265 Id. at 1367. 
266 See id. at 1371 (citing Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 1372. 
269 See id. at 1374 (“Evans’s speech falls under the wide umbrella of protected speech. 
It was an opinion of a student about a teacher, that was published off-campus, did not 
cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd, vulgar, threatening, or advocating 
illegal or dangerous behavior. Therefore, the Court finds that Evans had a  
constitutional right.”) 
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M. Summary of Federal Off-Campus Speech Cases 
In summary, there appears to be no controlling federal circuit 
court authority balancing the First Amendment against public 
school administrative discipline of off-campus cyberspeech in six 
of the twelve regional circuits: the First,270 Sixth, Seventh, 
Tenth,271 Eleventh, and the District of Columbia.272 Lower courts 
in at least three of these six “silent” circuits—the Seventh, Tenth, 
and Eleventh—have heard cyberspeech cases in the absence of 
circuit guidance, and each of these district courts’ analyses appears 
to presume Tinker’s applicability to off-campus cyberspeech.273 
The other six regional circuits—the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Eighth, and Ninth—have rendered detailed First Amendment-
based appellate decisions on the question of public school 
jurisdiction over cyberbullies. Collectively, these circuits have 
produced at least ten opinions274 which pit regulation of off-
                                                                                                             
270 The First Circuit has authority for the proposition that public schools are limited in 
their ability to restrict information leading to potentially offensive cyberspeech, such as 
censoring a URL on an in-school club poster. See Bowler v. Town of Hudson,  
514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 178 (D. Mass. 2007). 
271 Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide an off-campus 
cyberbully case on point, it heard and decided Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist.,  
713 F.3d 25, 36–39 (10th Cir. 2013), in which a student’s First Amendment challenge to 
a licensing scheme was turned away with language that implied strong deference to 
school district administrators. See id. at 36–39. The court ruled:  
[T]he [school’s] policy imposes substantive constraints on official 
discretion that are constitutionally sufficient in the special context of 
a public school, where students enjoy free speech rights but not to the 
same extent as they would in the public square. Additionally, we note 
that our conclusion is consistent with the trend of decisions of our 
sibling circuits on this issue. 
Id. at 43. 
272 See circuit-by-circuit analysis from en banc opinion in Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“The remainder of the circuits ([F]irst, 
[S]ixth, [S]eventh, [T]enth, [E]leventh, D.C.) do not appear to have addressed this 
issue.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
273 See generally T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 
767 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (exampling such a district court decision within the Seventh 
Circuit); Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (exampling such a district court decision within the 
Eleventh Circuit); D. G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12197 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (exampling such a district court decision from the  
Tenth Circuit). 
274 See generally Bell, 799 F.3d 379; Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 
(9th Cir. 2013); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th 
Cir. 2012); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756 (8th 
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campus cyberspeech against the First Amendment. This Article 
now distills from these cases, together with particularly compelling 
federal district court opinions, the most fair, durable, and broadly 
applicable policy guidance in an attempt to formulate a  
national rule. 
V. BEST-PRACTICE LEGAL CONCEPTS EMERGING FROM THE 
FEDERAL CASES 
A half-dozen principles emerge as best-practice judicial 
concepts from the federal off-campus student speech cases.275 
Below, these factors are listed and discussed. Later, they are 
incorporated into the Tinker-Cyberbully Test. 
COMEDY. First, parody, lampooning authority, and hyperbole 
will be protected if directed toward school administrators. Snyder 
and Layshock are the leading examples.276 The rationale seems to 
be that adults are more mature and have more capacity to 
withstand caustic, comedic speech. Also, adult employees are 
present at school by choice, unlike students, whose attendance is 
compulsory. If the speech is merely narcissistic, harmless sexual 
exhibitionism, the student wins, not because the speech is 
approved by the school, but because such regulation is beyond the 
school’s jurisdictional reach.277 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Snyder v. 
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 
(2012); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 
34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
275 As noted earlier, this Article attempts to rely upon federal circuit authority. 
Deviation from this methodology is justified and noted where a circuit lacks off-campus 
speech cases, or where a district court has released an opinion with particularly 
compelling reasoning in a case with a relevant fact pattern. 
276 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929, 933 (upholding First Amendment rights for MySpace 
page parodying a teacher); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08 (upholding First Amendment 
rights for MySpace page parodying a principal). But see Doninger, 642 F.3d at 340, 351 
(upholding ban on a would-be student office candidate from running because she called 
school administrators “douchebags” in a blog after they delayed a concert she helped 
plan), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011). 
277 See, e.g., B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (“I can conclude as a matter of law that the 
substantial disruption required by the Tinker test was not reasonably forecast.”). 
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DIRECT STUDENT BULLYING. Second, cruelty or vicious 
meanness aimed directly at a fellow student, or racist/sexist 
comments aimed at a target group, combined with affirmative 
transmission and disruption is typically unprotected speech. This is 
so even if the speech was transmitted from off-campus, and was 
only brought to the attention of students and campus officials via 
the Internet. Wilson and Kowalski are good examples.278 If the 
speech is both comedic cruelty and directed at another student—
i.e., Student’s Against Shay’s Herpes—the speech is more likely to 
be unprotected, particularly where other students are invited to join 
in on the cruelty.279 
OPINION. Third, there appears to be a developing “opinion” 
privilege under the First Amendment allowing students to critique 
their administrators and teachers, so long as the student speech 
does not run afoul of some other prohibition.280 If “Ms. Sarah 
Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met”281 is protected—and it 
should be—then it seems any legitimate critique of the 
performance of a teacher, administrator, school employee, school 
board member, or superintendent by a student also should be 
protected.282 This analysis, however, puts Doninger outside what 
appears to be the majority trend in these cases.283 
VIOLENT SPEECH/TRUE THREATS. Fourth, violent speech 
drafted off-campus but communicated to campus via the Internet, 
without more facts, will be de facto unprotected.284 There are many 
examples, but representative among them are D.J.M. and Wynar.285 
                                                                                                             
278 See generally Wilson, 696 F.3d 771 (analyzing suspension of students for creation of 
a blog containing racist and sexist comments about other students); Kowalski, 652 F.3d 
565 (analyzing suspension of student for creating a webpage ridiculing another student), 
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012). 
279 See, e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567–74. 
280 See, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
281 Id. at 1367. 
282 See id. at 1376–77. 
283 In Doninger, the court upheld a student’s ban from running for student office after 
she criticized the school administration on her blog. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 
334, 351 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting, however, that her criticism instigated on-campus 
disruptive activities, such as protests). 
284 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2007). 
285 See generally Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding no protection of speech regarding plans for a school shooting); D.J.M. ex rel. 
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These two cases include facts supporting not just 
administrative/school suspension, but also arrest and  
juvenile detention.286 
The tougher student speech cases in the violent/threatening 
speech sub-arena are those with a mix of comedy and violence—
sometimes complicated by a student’s legitimate First 
Amendment-protected opinion about the competence, skill, or 
allegedly improper behavior of a school employee.287 The 
representative federal appellate case from this category is 
Wisniewski.288 The U.S. Supreme Court has recently determined 
unequivocally that for a defendant to be convicted of the crime of 
communicating a true threat, the government must prove that the 
criminal defendant had some mens rea, or state of mind, bordering 
on or equal to intent to communicate the threat.289 In Elonis v. 
United States, the Court found that allegedly threatening 
statements should be reviewed by courts, not from the perspective 
of the alleged victim, but by the intent of the defendant who 
communicated the alleged threat.290 The Court stated that for a 
defendant who makes an alleged threat, “wrongdoing must be 
conscious to be criminal.”291 The Court left open the question 
whether recklessness (as opposed to affirmatively intentional 
conduct) was a sufficient state of culpability to support a criminal 
                                                                                                             
D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding no 
protection of speech regarding threats for same). 
286 See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1066; D.M., 647 F.3d at 759. 
287 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383–84, 391 (5th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (determining that there is no First Amendment protection for a violent online rap 
song with lyrics complaining about the sexual misconduct of a football coach), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374 (S.D. 
Fla. 2010) (finding “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met” online social 
media space was protected speech); D. G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. 00-C-0614-E, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *3–4, *13–19 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000) (protecting a 
student poem with the words “Killing Mrs. [Teacher]” because there was no intent  
to transmit). 
288 See 494 F.3d at 38. 
289 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015); see also Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (articulating true threat standard allowing 
criminal punishment only where a reasonable recipient of the speech would find that 
speech to be a serious expression of an intent to harm). 
290 See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012. 
291 Id. (quoting Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)). 
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conviction, but was clear that mere negligence or accident is not 
enough.292 Further, there is no controlling Supreme Court guidance 
on what standard ought to apply to such civil actions as student-
initiated First Amendment lawsuits to fight an expulsion based on 
an alleged threat made via social media.293 
SPORTS/COACHES. Fifth, if the student speech comes within 
the context of a team sport and substantially undermines the coach, 
the First Amendment will not protect such speech as advocacy to 
fire the coach while remaining on the team.294 But the area of team 
sports as physical education may be unique, and should not be 
extended beyond this narrow body of law. The Sixth Circuit 
analysis in Lowery might lead to the flawed conclusion that a 
faculty newspaper advisor or debate club sponsor would also be 
allowed to dismiss a student from the club or newspaper for 
insubordination.295 It should not, since the rationale behind the 
holding in Lowery goes directly to the unique nature of team 
sports.296 Also, it is the Author’s opinion that the facts and issue 
presented in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board underscore the 
point that where the student speech is directed at a coach in his 
general capacity as a school employee, rather than as a coach, the 
Lowery rule should not apply.297 That is, coaches ought to be able 
to discipline players for disloyalty, including undermining the 
authority of the coach.298 But if a non-athlete makes a claim 
against a coach which has nothing to do with the team, as was the 
case in Bell, the First Amendment ought to protect the student 
                                                                                                             
292 See id. at 2012–13. 
293 See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
294 See generally Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d at 584, 595–601 (6th Cir. 2007). 
295 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596, 600–01. 
296 Id. at 595 (“Mutual respect for the coach is an important ingredient of  
team chemistry.”). 
297 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 393, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). Note that Bell is closer to Evans than Lowery. 
See id. at 391, 393; cf. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 
2010) (holding that student’s social media post about her opinion on her teacher was 
protected speech). The student speaker in Bell was not a player who wanted the coach 
fired, but instead intended (with or without justification) to expose two adult school 
employees, who happened to be coaches, for allegedly acting sexually and improperly 
toward students. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 398. These facts are distinguishable from the 
player-initiated petition to fire the coach in Lowery. See id. at 391, 393. 
298 See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 594–96. 
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speech in the absence of some other policy rationale—such as 
protecting school employees from threats.299 It should be 
inapplicable when the speech is a matter of public concern not 
related to the sport, such as student speech purporting to expose 
crime, fraud, or improper sexual acts of school employees.300 
FORESEEABILITY/NEXUS TO SCHOOL. Sixth and finally, 
foreseeability—or the lack thereof—seems to be the most 
fundamental unifying concept among the off-campus speech cases. 
The First Amendment will protect speech characterized as a 
“wholly accidental” arrival onto school grounds.301 There exists in 
the cases a continuum between foreseeability on the one hand, and 
inadvertent transmission of speech to campus on the other. That is, 
the closer the nexus between the speech and the school, the more 
likely the speech is unprotected—provided that it also falls within 
one of the school speech exceptions, such as Tinker’s material 
disruption test. The Fifth Circuit held the student artist of the 
“siege” scene in Porter is protected by the First Amendment 
because his brother brought the work to the school by accident.302 
                                                                                                             
299 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 398–407 (showing how majority, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions divide along the rationale of whether the student speech at issue is primarily a 
threat from which school employees should be protected, or whistleblower speech of a 
student that is due protection under the First Amendment). 
300 See id. This argument was advanced on behalf of the student would-be 
whistleblower/rap artist in Bell but was rejected by the court. See id. at 400. The “Tinker-
Cyberbully Test” advanced below at Section V.B. would protect the speech of the known 
student/rapper in Bell, because the speech is arguably a bona fide critique of the school’s 
propensity to allow sexual harassment of students by school employees. Cf. id. at 433–43 
(Prado, J., dissenting). But see id. at 402–03 (Costa, J., concurring). Had Bell’s rap 
message been directed anonymously toward another student, it is the Author’s view that 
Bell would, and should, lose his anonymity protection under the First Amendment. See 
generally Benjamin A. Holden, Unmasking the Teen Cyberbully: A First Amendment-
Compliant Approach to Protecting Child Victims of Anonymous, School-Related Internet 
Harassment, 51 Akron L. Rev. 1 (2017) (building upon this Article and proposing a legal 
standard for judicial orders requiring internet service providers to supply the internet 
protocol address of computers sending anonymous school-related cyberbullying 
messages to student victims called the “Cyberbully Unmasking Test”); see also McIntyre 
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (finding a constitutional right to 
anonymous speech implied in the First Amendment). 
301 Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 617 (5th Cir. 2004). 
302 See id. 
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Other cases seem to follow this approach.303 Indeed, one factor 
cited in Snyder was the student’s efforts to keep the offending web 
page “private.”304 Speech which is accidently or inadvertently 
transmitted to a campus seems to place such speech in a category 
analogous to a password protected online Facebook page. The 
notion of “intent to communicate” seems to be a distinguishing 
touchstone, separating those speech fact patterns which judges find 
protected by the First Amendment from those which are 
unprotected. The concept that most rationally and logically 
balances the interests of student victims, with the rights of student 
speakers, and the obligations and responsibilities of school 
administrators, is the “nexus” analysis the Kowalski court 
employed.305 The Kowalski court probed the link between the off-
campus internet-based bullying speech of one student directed 
specifically at another, where a large number of fellow students 
were affirmatively invited to join in the cyberbullying.306 The court 
concluded that despite the off-campus character of the speech, the 
communication nonetheless had a sufficient “nexus” to the 
“[s]chool’s pedagogical interests” in keeping good order and 
protecting student victims.307 This approach may be the best place 
to start in developing a flexible, widely applicable test to separate 
student speech which ought to be protected by the First 
Amendment from that which, as a matter of policy, the Supreme 
Court should allow schools to discipline. After all, neither the text 
of the First Amendment,308 nor any subsequent case rendered by 
the Court contemplates the school-punishment-of-cyberbully 
paradigm. In the absence of facts that square up with a post-Tinker 
cyberbully student speech decision, linking the speech to the 
                                                                                                             
303 See, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting 
that post expressing student’s dislike for her teacher was never seen by the teacher and 
removed before students returned to school following an extended weekend). 
304 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012). 
305 See 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012). 
306 See id. at 567. 
307 Id. at 573. 
308 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
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school through a “nexus” test appears to be the most fair and 
logical point of departure articulated by any court decision 
researched for this Article. 
VI. TOWARD A NATIONAL STANDARD FOR OFF-CAMPUS 
CYBERBULLY SPEECH 
Formulation of a fair and workable legal rule which might vie 
for consideration as a preferred approach in the adjudication of 
Cyberbully speech cases requires context. The majority of the 
underlying principles and assumptions of the student speech cases 
pre-date teens’ widespread use of the Internet as a primary means 
of communication.309 Courts should begin with the premise that 
traditional boundaries of the “schoolhouse gate” are meaningless in 
2016, and will become even more irrelevant in the future.310 
A. The Need for a Constitutionally Valid Off-Campus Standard 
The U.S. Supreme Court has been silent on the question of 
whether schools have jurisdiction to regulate off-campus speech by 
students.311 There are twelve regional federal circuits, each with its 
own court of appeals; however, there should not be twelve versions 
of the First Amendment. There have been repeated calls for 
                                                                                                             
309 Note that the most recent student speech case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
was Morse v. Frederick in 2007—two years before Facebook supplanted MySpace as 
America’s dominant social media network. See 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
310 This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court’s “basic principles” guiding analysis 
for application of the First Amendment to new media should be imperiled or even 
amended. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). The Tinker-
Cyberbully Test extends, rather than creates, a new basic principle. “And whatever the 
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic 
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do 
not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears.” Id. (quoting 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). It is the Author’s opinion that 
virtual teaching and virtual classrooms, already common at the college level, will make 
their way more frequently to the doorstep of home schooled and other public school 
children who are nonetheless under the jurisdiction of local school districts. 
311 See, e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d 565; J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 
650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012) (consolidated with 
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011)); 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011); see 
also HAYES, supra note 3, at 49. 
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Supreme Court guidance,312 but to no avail.313 In this void, half of 
the federal circuits—the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Ninth—have implicitly or explicitly concluded that off-campus 
speech can be regulated and/or banned by schools;314 although the 
only consistent conclusion among the courts seems to be that 
student speech, which implies eventual violence by the speaker, is 
not protectable.315 Research revealed no controlling appellate 
                                                                                                             
312 See generally Waldman, supra note 7, at 617–18; S. Kate Fletcher, Note, 
Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Social Media Rams the Tinker Schoolhouse 
Gate: A New Approach for Online Student Speech, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1113 
(2013); Katherine Hokenson, Comment, My Teacher Sux! [Censored]: Protecting 
Students’ Right to Free Speech on the Internet, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
385, 407–08 (2011) (analyzing controversies over students’ online criticism of  
school officials). 
313 See Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 208 (2007) (“[C]ases involving speech in the schools are 
overwhelmingly more common in the state and federal inferior courts than are cases 
dealing with . . . any of a host of other First Amendment subjects . . . .”); see also HAYES, 
supra note 3, at 49; David L. Hudson Jr., Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-
Campus, Online Student Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621, 621 (2012); Aaron J. Hersh, Note, 
Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest Proposal to Protect Public-School Students’ First 
Amendment Free Expression Rights in the Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309 (2013). See 
generally Martha McCarthy, Cyberbullying Laws and First Amendment Rulings: Can 
They Be Reconciled?, 83 MISS. L.J. 805, 805–06 (2014) (criticizing the Supreme Court 
for its failure to act on the growing cyberbully discord in the wake of Tinker). 
314 However, the Ninth Circuit in Wynar v. Douglas County School District sought 
guidance from the Third Circuit en banc opinion in Snyder, and concluded that “[t]he 
Third and Fifth Circuits have left open the question whether Tinker applies to off-campus 
speech.” 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013). This Article respectfully disagrees with 
this narrow reading of the cases in those two circuits, in light of the analyses of the Third 
Circuit’s Snyder opinion and the Fifth Circuit’s Porter opinion. The federal district court 
in T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community School Corp. took the same view as the 
Author on the Third Circuit’s assumption of Tinker’s applicability to cyberspeech. See 
807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 781 (N.D. Ind. 2011). The Snyder dissent, signed by six Third 
Circuit appellate judges, also notes the Snyder majority’s “apparent adoption of the rule 
that off-campus student speech can rise to the level of a substantial disruption.” Snyder, 
650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
315 See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1074–75 (finding school discipline based on multiple 
threatening messages yielded no First Amendment violation); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. 
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011); see also B.V., 807 F. 
Supp. 2d at 771–72, 790 (determining that sexually raunchy humor and photos are 
protected by First Amendment and that the school district violated students’ First 
Amendment rights by suspending them). Compare Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920 (ruling that 
the school violated a student’s First Amendment rights by suspending her for making a 
cruel parody of the school’s principal on a fake MySpace page), with Kowalski, 652 F.3d 
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authority from any circuit for the proposition that Tinker puts off-
campus speech beyond the school’s reach as a matter of law.316 
Some courts weighing the issue do not directly address the 
jurisdiction question, but instead presume it.317 However, these 
inconsistent and conflicting results for the individual students 
involved stem from similar fact patterns in different courts. These 
courts appear to leap directly from Tinker, decided the year 
America first landed a man on the Moon, to this Brave New World 
in which student speech is instantaneously uttered, beamed into 
outer space, and returned to the eyes and ears of hundreds or even 
thousands of fellow students in the blink of an eye. 
What is needed is a predictable, underlying legal test, based on 
the collective learning of the off-campus cyberspeech cases, but 
divorced from the peculiar facts of each case. Many of these cases 
have harsh, even disgusting language, sometimes interspersed with 
legitimate literary parody, social criticism, or critiques of the 
public school or its employees. If the government, as manifest in 
school authority, misbehaves, students deserve the right to speak 
and expose wrongdoing. Failing to acknowledge this concern 
would invite the evil of sedition, or punishment by government for 
criticism of government, into the schoolhouse gate. But the way the 
cases now arise from speech, to discipline, to courthouse, to 
resolution is arbitrary and inconsistent. Some cases appear to be 
exercises in gut instincts followed by random judicial 
conclusions.318 The offensive language is tweeted, posted to 
                                                                                                             
at 567, 574–77 (ruling that the suspension a high schooler for creating MySpace page 
mocking a classmate for allegedly having herpes did not violate the constitution). 
316 However, as discussed above, the five-judge concurring opinion in Snyder takes the 
view that Tinker forbids school jurisdiction over off-campus speech as a matter of law, 
while joining with the eight judges who signed the majority opinion, which presumed that 
Tinker allowed school jurisdiction. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
317 See B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (exampling such a district court decision within the 
Seventh Circuit); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370–71, 1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 
2010) (exampling such a district court decision within the Eleventh Circuit); D. G. v. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *10–15 
(N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000) (exampling such a district court decision within the  
Tenth Circuit). 
318 See, e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 576–77 (ruling that cruel fake web pages are not 
protected by First Amendment); Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920 (ruling that cruel fake web 
pages are protected by First Amendment); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 340–41, 
351 (2d Cir. 2011) (ruling that mean blog posts are not protected by First Amendment), 
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Facebook, texted, or blogged to classmates, the language becomes 
a “thing” with other students, the principal finds out, the student is 
suspended, the parents sue, and the courts cite to Tinker and flip a 
coin. Violence or true threats always seem to trump First 
Amendment concerns, and this is as it should be. But what about 
everything else? 
B. The Tinker-Cyberbully Test319 
Employing Tinker with no eye toward the realities of modern 
internet speech and communications has led to inconsistent results 
among the federal circuits and the attendant lack of clear guidance 
for lower courts. Instead, courts should interpret the seminal school 
speech case in light of the best approaches by courts that have 
wrestled with the issues, until the Supreme Court settles the matter. 
What follows is the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, a proposed multi-part 
standard for courts to apply to off-campus speech, which in the 
social media era, is frequently cyberspeech:320 
                                                                                                             
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011); B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 772, 790 (ruling that parody 
sex photos are protected by First Amendment). 
319 As discussed previously, all disruptive off-campus speech in the internet era is not 
cyberspeech. However, the fact patterns in the case law are strongly trending toward 
internet-based communications. Thus, the solution contemplated in this Article presumes 
off-campus speech problems are based in cyberspeech. It is obvious that on-campus 
cyberspeech—say, a mean text from a student in the cafeteria to a student in a 
classroom—is already clearly covered under Tinker and is not in need of a new, 
consistent legal solution. 
320 Such speech is assumed to be a product of the “social media” era. This Article 
places the start of the “social media era” around the year 2000, although an exact date is 
not a premise of this analysis. For background and context only, it is noteworthy that 
early social media sites were niche sites targeted to racial minorities: AsianAvenue.com, 
founded in 1997, BlackPlanet.com in 1999, and Hispanic-oriented MiGente.com in 2000. 
See Digital Trends Staff, The History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 16, 
2016), http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/ 
[https://perma.cc/6N3T-MB2N]. These niche sites were followed soon after by the now-
ubiquitous general audience social media networks such as Friendster in 2002, LinkedIn 
and MySpace in 2003, and Facebook, which was launched in 2004, but finally opened to 
the general public in 2006. See id.; see also Jeff Burt, Facebook at [Ten]: Highlights in 
the Social Networking Pioneer’s History, EWEEK (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://www.eweek.com/cloud/slideshows/facebook-at-10-highlights-in-the-social-
networking-pioneers-history.html [https://perma.cc/2M36-M8LM] (discussing the 
evolution of Facebook). 
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(a) Was it reasonably foreseeable from the perspective of an 
objective adult that the student speech would reach321 the 
campus environment? If no, stop. The speech is protected by 
the First Amendment;322 
(b) Was the message contained in the student speech arguably a 
bona fide critique of the job performance or decisions of school 
employees,323 the school itself, or an obvious parody?324 If yes 
to any of these, stop. The speech is protected by the First 
Amendment;325 and 
                                                                                                             
321 The Fifth Circuit in Porter, and perhaps the Sixth in Lowery, analyzed speech 
created off-campus and physically transported back to campus. See discussion supra 
Sections IV.E–F. For purposes of this Article, the jurisdictional question of regulating 
off-campus speech which was physically transported to a campus is deemed legally 
indistinguishable from the question of jurisdiction over internet-originated cyberbullying. 
322 The school lacks “jurisdiction” because the speech is not school-related and beyond 
the reach of Tinker. See generally Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 
1979); see also Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 618–19 (5th Cir. 2004). 
323 Commentators and courts both tend to distinguish between disparaging student 
speech which targets students, versus that which targets school employees, particularly if 
employee fitness is part of the disparagement. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920, 931 n.9; cf. 
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567. The rationales differ, but a consistent theme in the literature 
as well as the cases is that disruption is more likely when the victim is a child, who likely 
has less personal maturity and ability to withstand cruel jokes and teasing. See, e.g., Watt 
Lesley Black, Jr., Omnipresent Student Speech and the Schoolhouse Gate: Interpreting 
Tinker in the Digital Age, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 531, 554 (2015). 
324 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47–48, 57 (1988) (finding First 
Amendment protection for the parody of a public figure preacher claiming he had sex 
with his mother in an outhouse). However, when dealing with schoolchildren and mean-
spirited speech, particularly over the Internet, the vexing “parody problem” becomes 
more complicated. That is, where is the line between the Layshock and Snyder fake web 
pages claiming principals used steroids or “hit on” students, which the Third Circuit said 
nobody took seriously, versus the one in Kowalski which claimed a young woman had 
herpes? Compare Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920–21, with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–09 (3d Cir. 2011); see also W. Wat Hopkins, 
Snyder v. Phelps, Private Persons and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A 
Chance for the Supreme Court to Set Things Right, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 149, 178–79 
(2010) (“The [Court’s Hustler] opinion tells us almost nothing about whether the 
Constitution protects outrageous communications that are privately disseminated rather 
than displayed in the pages of a nationally distributed magazine . . . or whether it protects 
outrageous communications that are designed to hurt or embarrass private figures . . . .” 
(quoting Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous 
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
601, 615 (1990))). 
325 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a main purpose of a public school 
system is reinforcing the values of free thought, Democracy, and self-governance. See, 
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(c) Was the speech reasonably likely to (i) substantially disrupt 
the student learning environment326 or (ii) materially interfere 
with the ability of any other student to learn?327 If no to both, 
the speech is protected by the First Amendment. If yes to 
                                                                                                             
e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply 
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us 
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of 
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom. ‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than 
in the community of American schools.’ The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of 
ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that 
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] 
than through any kind of authoritative selection.’” (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (first quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); then quoting United 
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943))). The Third Circuit favorably 
cited Keyishian in a well-reasoned dissent by Judge D. Michael Fisher in a 2011 
cyberbullying case, quoting this exact language and adding: “Schools should foster an 
environment of learning that is vital to the functioning of a democratic system and the 
maturation of a civic body.” Snyder, 650 F.3d at 944 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
326 The issue of true threats is implied in the “disturbance” prong of the Tinker-
Cyberbully Test. A factual finding by a school that a student’s expression can be 
“reasonably understood as urging violent conduct” is adequate to support a school 
suspension, expulsion, or other discipline. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 
(2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). The Author urges courts to follow the reasoning of the 
Third Circuit in Wisniewski rather than that of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which 
would protect student speech employing such words as “kill” in messages if the school 
could not prove that: (1) the student subjectively either intended to make a threat or, 
perhaps, (2) that the student was reckless in communicating his message. See discussion 
supra Sections IV.H–I. This is bad policy; it strips away from school administrators any 
latitude in disciplining speech that is completely inappropriate in a school environment, 
but does not meet the constitutional criminal law requirements of Watts and Elonis. See 
United States v. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). That criminal due process standard now constitutionally 
required for adult criminal defendants goes too far to be applied to the review of school 
administrative discipline, and ought to yield to the overriding public interest in protecting 
the school environment. It should be noted, however, that adoption of the contrary 
approach—essentially giving students an affirmative defense if the school cannot prove 
adequate subjective intent—would leave the remaining parts of the “Cyberbully 
Unmasking Test” undisturbed and still of potential use to courts. See supra notes 299–
300 and accompanying text. 
327 Further refinement of this test to directly address the issue of true threats versus 
childish jokes might include an affirmative defense for student speakers who have been 
“cleared” by police. Such an affirmative defense might reverse the decision in 
Wisniewski. See 494 F.3d at 36 (noting police investigator concluded that allegedly 
threatening speech was a “joke” and closed the criminal case against the student). 
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either, the speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and 
the school may discipline the student. 
VII. APPLYING THE TINKER-CYBERBULLY TEST TO SIX 
REPRESENTATIVE CASES 
A newly proposed legal standard to a developing problem is of 
no use if it has no practical application. It is of even less use if it 
thwarts expectations and leads to unexpected and inconsistent 
results. The section below applies the Tinker-Cyberbully Test to 
six328 cases,329 all of which were previously discussed in this 
Article. These cases were chosen for two reasons. First, they raise 
the broad array of issues confronted by modern schools, and 
eventually appellate courts. Second, their original (actual) judicial 
results highlight the random results delivered by federal courts, 
underscoring the conflict among the circuits and the need for a 
national standard for school discipline of off-campus  
cyberbully speech. 
The Supreme Court, in any cyberbullying case granted 
certiorari to decide the off-campus speech issue, would do well to 
assist lower courts by sharpening the meaning of “disruption.”330 
That is, disruption of whom within the learning environment? This 
analysis takes the view that the initial rationale to protect students 
is best advanced by limiting Tinker’s disruption exception to 
disruption of student learning.331 If the teachers are made 
uncomfortable in the faculty lounge by a blog suggesting that they 
do a poor job of teaching, they should have no ability to go on a 
witch hunt to find their detractors. Thus, part “(c)” of the Tinker-
Cyberbully Test is written to intentionally insert the adjective 
“student” prior to “learning environment,” slightly modifying the 
Tinker standard as applied to the punishment or protection of off-
                                                                                                             
328 Two “violence” cases are combined and treated as a single case because their facts 
are legally indistinguishable for purposes of this analysis. 
329 See infra Sections VII.A–F. Other than the first three cases, which need no 
alteration, the facts may be altered slightly to allow application of the  
Tinker-Cyberbully Test. 
330 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–15 
(1969) (formulating the disruption test). 
331 See, e.g., id. at 512–14. 
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campus speech. This gives greater protection to student speakers, 
who would not be subject to expulsion or suspension from thin-
skinned adults. But of course, student speech aimed at an adult 
could do so much damage that it actually does affect the students’ 
learning environment. On such facts, the speaker would not  
be protected. 
A. Case 1: Doninger v. Niehoff332: Insulting Critique of  
School Authority 
Under the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, Doninger was incorrectly 
decided.333 In Doninger, a student, Avery Doninger, wrote several 
entries in her publicly accessible blog detailing her ongoing 
negotiations with school administrators about the scheduling of a 
high school-sponsored concert called “Jamfest.”334 She called 
school officials “douchebags” and ignored repeated requests to 
stop criticizing school officials, ultimately leading a protest that 
consisted of having students wear shirts in support of Avery and/or 
free speech rights.335 The Second Circuit concluded that the school 
was justified in disciplining Doninger and that her speech was 
unprotected by the First Amendment.336 
Under the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, courts should reach the 
opposite result. First, though insulting, no reasonable person could 
have believed that school administrators were actual 
“douchebags.”337 And second, the insults hurled at her school 
authority figures were all cloaked in her unfavorable critique of 
their job performance.338 Other scholarly commentaries have 
suggested that the Doninger case was incorrectly decided and/or 
                                                                                                             
332 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011). 
333 See id. at 358 (upholding school discipline of student for harsh critique of school 
officials’ policy decision communicated via social media). 
334 See id. at 339–41. 
335 See id. at 340–44. 
336 See id. at 351, 358. 
337 See id. at 349 (discussing the possible disruptiveness of, inter alia, the term 
“douchebags” and the blog posts). 
338 See id. at 340–41. The clearest example of this critique defense reviewed for this 
Article is the district court case from the Southern District of Florida in which a student 
created a blog claiming her teacher was the “worst teacher I’ve ever met.” See Evans v. 
Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (determining that the statement 
was protected under the First Amendment, just as the Tinker-Cyberbully Test would). 
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criticized its reasoning.339 Applying the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, 
the student wins, reversing the result340 in the actual case.341 
B. Case 2: Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District342: Cruel 
Parody of School Authority 
The Third Circuit found that J.S., the eighth-grade honor 
student who created a phony MySpace page to ridicule her 
principal in jest, engaged in First Amendment protected activity.343 
Although the phony web page—when viewed as a bona fide 
critique of government, or school administration—contained scant 
legitimate criticism of the principal, it did “complain” that the 
principal’s hobby is “detention.”344 Her parody of her principal 
was vulgar, juvenile, and nonsensical according to the majority 
opinion from the Third Circuit345 and “mean-spirited” as well as 
“insulting” according to the concurrence.346 But because it was 
directed at an adult, the Tinker-Cyberbully Test—certainly not the 
exclusive remedy of an adult wronged by a child—would offer no 
remedy to her principal. The conclusion, both in the actual Third 
Circuit en banc case and under this new hypothetical standard, is 
                                                                                                             
339 See, e.g., Allison E. Hayes, Note, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. 
Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 
AKRON L. REV. 247, 271–84 (2010); see also Travis Miller, Note, Doninger v. Niehoff: 
Taking Tinker Too Far, 5 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 303, 321–29 (2011). 
340 See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 358. 
341 It should be well noted that courts tend to be much more forgiving of student-to-
adult cyberbullying than taunts directed to students. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920–21 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing student cyber-
insults directed at an adult), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); cf. Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing student cyber-insults 
directed at another student), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). The initial portion of 
Part “(c)” of the Tinker-Cyberbully Test should be read literally: Was the speech 
reasonably likely to substantially disrupt the student learning environment? Thus, a harsh 
or even profane critique of teachers, principals, and administrators, so frequently the 
subject of such disputes, would be presumptively disfavored as justification for discipline 
unless some student was impacted. The principal and teachers can avail themselves of the 
courts and seek other remedies if they are libeled or criminally harassed. Adults have 
greater access to the courts and the initial policy rationale of the exception left for Tinker 
was to protect students, not school employees. 
342 650 F.3d 915. 
343 See id. at 933. 
344 See id. at 920–21. 
345 See id. at 929. 
346 Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring). 
294       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:233 
 
that the school lacks authority to punish this student speech, which 
is protected by the First Amendment.347 
The student speaker in Snyder should win for three reasons, 
although none of them clear-cut. First, she has the parody defense, 
upon which the Third Circuit relied to dispose of the actual case.348 
Next, she has the disruption defense—that is, student learning was 
not actually impacted.349 It appears that the parody only distracted 
administrators and even they, according to the court record, did not 
invest much time in the matter.350 And third, she has the 
foreseeability defense, since she took steps to keep the offending 
web page private.351 Applying the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, the 
student wins—the same result352 as in the actual case.353 
C. Case 3: Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools354: Gratuitous 
Student Cyberbullying 
Kowalski was judged by the Fourth Circuit to be subject to 
discipline because it was reasonably foreseeable that the student’s 
online speech would have such a close nexus to the school 
environment that it should be deemed virtual student speech.355 
Kara Kowalski, who tormented Shay N. with the false charge that 
                                                                                                             
347 Note that the analysis under Layshock would be identical to that of Snyder due to the 
similarity of the facts. Compare id. at 920–23 (discussing student’s creation of a fake 
social media profile of student’s principal), with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–10 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing same). 
348 See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 929 (“Moreover, the profile, though indisputably vulgar, 
was so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could take its content 
seriously, and the record clearly demonstrates that no one did.”). 
349 See id. at 928 (“There is no dispute that J.S.’s speech did not cause a substantial 
disruption in the school.”). 
350 See id. at 922–23. 
351 See id. at 928–29 (“The facts in this case do not support the conclusion that a 
forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable.”); see also id. at 930. 
352 See id. at 933. 
353 Note that without steps to keep the web page private and with slightly more 
disruption as a matter of fact, the result could be reversed under the  
Tinker-Cyberbully Test. 
354 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012). The Kowalski 
court expressly addressed the “child protection” notion and derived the “Nexus to 
School’s Pedagogical Interests” test, which appears to be a web-era play upon 
Hazelwood’s “legitimate pedagogical interest” standard. See id. at 573; see also 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
355 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573; see also supra notes 305–08 and accompanying text. 
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the girl had herpes,356 would also get no First Amendment 
protection under the Tinker-Cyberbully Test. The school prevailed 
in the actual case,357 consistent with the result here. The school can 
easily make its concrete showing, demonstrating foreseeability in 
Kara Kowalski’s decision to invite classmates to comment on the 
site.358 Further, there was nothing redeeming or related to a critique 
of the school or administration in the subject speech.359 The speech 
caused great harm to its victim, Shay N., which was clearly Ms. 
Kowalski’s intent.360 This case, like Wilson,361 is an example of 
gratuitous student-to-student cyberbullying which is unworthy of 
the First Amendment’s protection as a matter of policy. Applying 
the Tinker-Cyberbully Test, the school wins—the same result362 as 
in the actual case. 
D. Case 4: Lowery v. Euverard: Written Anti-Coach Mutiny by 
Players Is Unprotected 
A fair and sensible cyberspeech test must allow coaches to 
avoid on-the-field mutiny, but protect political and socially 
important student speech. A coach’s job in part is to teach, and one 
of the things a high school coach teaches is teamwork. Part “(b)” 
of the Tinker-Cyberbully Test—while requiring some unavoidable 
judicial discretion—takes care to modify the noun “criticism” with 
the adjective “bona fide.”363 A court moving toward the conclusion 
that there has been no bona fide critique in a specific case of 
student speech criticizing an employee-coach could take shelter 
under Hazelwood’s “imprimatur of the school”364 umbrella. Thus, 
a finding that the criticism was illegitimate would support a finding 
that the school needs to teach teamwork and cohesion in team 
                                                                                                             
356 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567–68. 
357 See id. at 577. 
358 See id. at 567, 574. 
359 See generally id. at 567–69. 
360 See id. at 576 (“Kowalski’s role . . . was particularly mean-spirited and hateful. The 
webpage called on classmates, in a pack, to target Shay N., knowing that it would  
be hurtful . . . .”). 
361 696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing twin brothers who created sexually 
explicit and racist blog that targeted other school children to review the content). 
362 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 577. 
363 See supra Section VI.B. 
364 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
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sports, a legitimate pedagogical concern for student-athletes to be 
sure. If the coach is endangering the health or safety of players—
but doing so only at private practices—a petition to fire that coach 
ought to be protected speech. This is a matter of evidentiary 
proof.365 If, as was the case in Lowery,366 the players simply do not 
“like” the coach due to personnel or tactical differences of opinion, 
such speech is materially disruptive to the learning environment on 
the sports field. Coaches have been kicking players off high school 
football teams for as long as there have been high school football 
teams. The Tinker-Cyberbully Test would not and should not 
disturb legitimate dismissals of insubordinate players. Thus, the 
school wins; the same result367 occurs as in actual case. 
E. Case 5: D.M./Wynar: Two Cases of Violent Student Speech368 
These two cases are treated as one because they are legally 
indistinguishable. School administrators in both could find it 
reasonably foreseeable that specific threats of violence by a student 
could cause substantial disruption.369 The speech in both cases 
would easily be removed from the realm of First Amendment 
protection—whether employing the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s 
requirement that the school comply with the criminal law “true 
threat” intent-of-the-speaker370 requirements of Watts—or the 
more school-deferential approach advocated by the Second Circuit 
in Wisniewski.371 Either way, on extreme facts calling for specific 
acts of violence against specific fellow students, the Tinker-
Cyberbully Test would allow administrative/school punishment of 
off-campus cyberbullying. The School wins; achieving the same 
result as in the actual cases.372 
                                                                                                             
365 See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2007). 
366 See generally id. at 585–86. 
367 See id. at 600–01. 
368 Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013); D.J.M. ex rel. 
D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). 
369 See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1065–66; D.M., 647 F.3d at 765. 
370 See Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621–27 (8th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc); Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371–73  
(9th Cir. 1996). 
371 See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007). 
372 Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1075; D.M., 647 F.3d at 767. 
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F. Case 6: The Wisniewski Problem: Comic-Violent Speech 
Student speech comprised of both comedy and potential threats 
poses a particularly troublesome problem for courts. Given the 
toxic mix of immature bravado, anti-establishment machismo, and 
plain juvenile silliness found in the cases, it is often difficult to 
separate potentially dangerous student cyberspeech from that 
which is merely tasteless.373 Beyond the larger question of Tinker’s 
reach to off-campus speech—the central question presented in this 
Article—is the related issue of whether administrative school 
discipline based on a student threat requires subjective intent to 
harm beyond mere negligence.374 The Tinker-Cyberbully Test 
adopts what this Article will call the Wisniewski Rule, most clearly 
articulated by the Second Circuit.375 The Wisniewski Rule rejects 
the criminal due process protections of Watts.376 This result allows 
schools greater discretion despite law enforcement’s independent 
determination that, for example, a student was only joking when 
making alleged threats, therefore giving school officials greater 
flexibility to impose administrative discipline, such as suspensions, 
in the interests of the practical realities of maintaining school 
order.377 Applying the Tinker-Cyberbully Test to the Wisniewski 
facts results in the school discipline being upheld, which is the 
same result378 as in the actual case. 
                                                                                                             
373 See, e.g., Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36–37 (noting that police investigator concluded 
allegedly threatening speech was a “joke” although school took the threat seriously and 
suspended student). 
374 See supra Section IV.B. 
375 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38 (“[W]e think that school officials have significantly 
broader authority to sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows.”). Note that 
the Supreme Court offered greater specificity to the requirements of Watts in Elonis. See 
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012–14 (2015) (holding that threatening 
statements are analyzed not from the perspective of the alleged victim, but by the intent 
of the maker of the alleged threat, and that to support a criminal conviction, the mindset 
of the speaker must be proven to evince a “true threat” requiring a level of mens rea or 
intent greater than negligence). 
376 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (articulating true 
threat standard allowing criminal punishment only where a reasonable recipient of the 
speech would find that speech to be a serious expression of an intent to harm). 
377 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38. 
378 See id. at 39–40. 
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G. Test Would Change One of Six Results, But Offer Predictability 
In summary, the Tinker-Cyberbully Test would likely allow a 
public school to punish the cyberbully in two-of-the-six cases 
analyzed immediately above.379 Off-campus student speech would 
generally be protected if it harshly critiques adult employees or 
parodies authority. Student speech is unprotected if it is disruptive 
and aimed at another student, or if it is a “true threat” under the 
applicable local administrative standard, which may be lower than 
the constitutional criminal law standard.380 The Tinker-Cyberbully 
Test would change the result in just one of the six cases above,381 
but offer greater predictability of result. The fundamental shift 
between the actual cases and their likely adjudication under this 
hypothetical new rule is that student speakers would virtually 
always win when their speech focused on a critique of the school 
or its employees, or when its arrival on campus was unforeseeable 
by a reasonable adult. The student would nearly always lose when 
the speech was an affirmative cruel bullying of a fellow student, 
particularly where classmates are invited to “publically” join in. 
CONCLUSION 
The question presented in this Article was whether primary and 
secondary schools can exert disciplinary authority consistent with 
the First Amendment over student cyberspeech that originates off-
campus, makes its way “onto” campus, and at the time it was 
communicated, raised a reasonably foreseeable risk of material 
school disruption. A growing circuit conflict, and the lack of 
Supreme Court guidance in an age of widespread student use of 
social media, makes the question more urgent than ever. The 
Article first reviewed and analyzed the conflicting federal circuit 
court cases in the area, concluding that schools can, consistent with 
the First Amendment, discipline student off-campus speech—
including cyberbullying, if based on appropriate facts. Then a new 
                                                                                                             
379 See supra Sections VII.A–F. 
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legal standard for such discipline (or protection) of off-campus 
speech was proposed. The Tinker-Cyberbully Test urges the courts 
toward a moderate and realistic legal standard in light of the 
modern-day realities of cyberspace, where the twenty-first century 
student speaker now lives and communicates. Under the Tinker-
Cyberbully Test, courts are offered a new, consistent standard for 
determining when Tinker’s disruptive student speech paradigm 
should be extended to off-campus speakers, including cyberbullies. 
The test allows latitude for student speakers to critique their 
schools and the job performance of teachers, principals, and other 
school personnel. But where the student has allegedly made a “true 
threat,” or has engaged in disruptive student-to-student 
cyberbullying, school administrators may discipline the student. 
The test does not magically solve the entire problem. But it would 
offer consistency and predictability among the federal circuit 
courts now in conflict, as well as offer clarity to students, parents, 
teachers, principals, and school districts. 
